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Colombia has tolerated for almost fifty years the oldest guerrilla movements in 
the region, but at the same time the country has showed stable economic growth up until 
1998. Now, in the face of an economic recession, the puzzle is to establish which of the 
following variables; guerrilla violence, illicit drug trafficking, or the 1991 Constitution, 
have most affected economic stability in the last half of 1990s.  
 
The thesis will argue:  
(1) Guerrilla violence is the most important variable that impacts Colombia’s 
economy, causing severe internal and external migration. Kidnapping, extortion, 
terrorism, and infrastructure attacks represent the loss of million of dollars in 
economic damages. 
(2) The illicit drug trafficking is the second most important variable that has affected 
Colombia’s economy, causing an economic domestic boom during the period of 
the Cali and Medellin drug-cartels, infiltrating the economy with money 
laundering and fictitious business. 
      (3) The 1991 Constitution, the third variable, established many new economic 
responsibilities at the state level, which aggravated the state fiscal crisis. The 
separation of taxation and spending among different levels of government has 
fueled severe problems of fiscal imbalance, because the bulk of tax revenues is 
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A. GENERAL AREA OF RESEARCH 
 
 Colombia in 1999 faced the deepest economic crisis in fifty years with a negative 
GDP of 4.5 percent. Colombia historically has had one of the most stable economies in 
Latin America. The economy enjoyed uninterrupted growth from 1932 until the mid-
1990s when the economy began to unravel due to a complex blend: (1) terrorism and 
violence generated by subversive actors; (2) Clinton’s drug war decertification (the U.S. 
sanctions did not succeed in driving President Samper from office, but they reduced 
business confidence and contributed to the sharpening of the economic crisis); and (3) 
weak institutions incapable of enforcing the rule of law to prevent rampant corruption 
and impunity. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The puzzle is to establish which of the following variables: guerrilla violence, 
illicit drug trafficking or weak institutions created with the 1991 Constitution have most 
affected economic stability in the last half of the 1990s. 
C. MAIN FINDINGS  
 
1. Guerrilla violence  
The accumulation of terrorism and violence generated by the Army Revolutionary 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Self-Defense 
Organization (AUC)—called paramilitaries—were the heaviest factors contributing to 
Colombia’s economic recession in 1999, considered the most critical in Colombian 
history in the twenty-century. The lack of domestic and foreign economic incentives for 
investment was due to terrorism and violence, which until today continues spreading its 
damage over the national territory. The terrorism continues fueling unemployment, 
economic uncertainty, and the lost of confidence for opening new businesses or for 
starting joint ventures, especially in the agricultural, cattle, and mining sectors. These 
sectors are considered very important for peasantry stability by preventing migration to 
the metropolitan areas where urban violence is rising.  
 xv
2. Illicit Drug Trafficking  
Drug trafficking was the second heavy factor that fed subversive violence and 
contributed to the economic recession. Today drugs continue spreading its criminal 
power through its atomization in small white-collar organizations, its complicated 
tracking and its detection (due its low profile) by law enforcement. 
In fact, the drug-profit continues to return to Colombia (it is no more than 20 
percent of the total foreign drug-markets earnings) with the implication of being 
converted into weapons, ammunition and logistic supplies for the terrorist actors. Thus, 
the aggregate value for Colombia’s economy sector is minimal. Additionally, money- 
laundering in the informal sector continues to feed smugglers and contraband businesses, 
worsening the economic situation of the medium and small Colombian enterprises due to 
unfair market competition, causing unemployment and social unrest. 
Finally, the main constraint on the counter-narcotics policy is the traffickers’ 
ability to corrupt and intimidate the political system because drug-power undermines the 
rule of law.  
3. The 1991 Constitution  
The 1991 Constitution, the third factor, has indirectly contributed to the economic 
recession by its lack of power to guarantee through state institutions connivance, justice, 
peace, development and economic growth. The institutions developed after the 1991 
Constitution continue to function with the same clientelistic political behavior where 
patronage and rent-seeking is the bottom line. The corruption survives because no ex-ante 
oversight was established. Undoubtably, “the civil society” willing to do this does not 
exist in real terms. Moreover, terrorist escalation has impeded the fiscal and municipal 
decentralization process given its intimidator power and manipulation over almost 600 
municipalities and its mayors’ outcomes. In addition, the social security system continues 
to run with a   serious fiscal unbalance. Therefore, the system would collapse if due to the 
lack of political consensus among labor unions, congressmen, and enterprise owners.  
Finally, the 1991 Constitution is considered a rigid micromanagement tool that 
complicated the globalization process and the need for flexibility in opening markets, 
 xvi
labor supply, and domestic and foreign investment. Its criteria of indexation of pensions, 
goals for inflation, and the allocation of regional public expenditures (as a welfare state) 
complicated the flow of capital-investment, services and goods required in opening 
markets. Moreover, the weak state institutions created after the 1991 Constitution 
demonstrated its inability to provide basic public goods: justice, security and defense. For 
this reason, peace continues to be an elusive proposition, and the criminal actors often 
violating fundamental rights of citizens, especially the right of life, continue to exist. 
D. CONCLUSION  
Colombian history shows that Samper’s Administration from 1994 to 1998 was 
unwilling to confront the terrorist organizations with enough political and military power. 
Thus, the intense use of violence and corruption accumulated in this period affected 
finally Colombia’s socio-economic well-being and fueled the economic crisis until it 
reached a negative (-4.5) percent of GDP in 1999, never seen before in national economic 
history. In fact, some Colombian experts estimate that this conflict costs the country from 
4 percent to 9 percent of growth per year.1 
The gross direct cost of violence and terrorism between 1990 and 1998 reached 
$3.2 billion US dollars a year, meaning 4.5 percent of the GDP. Perhaps, this estimate 
does not consider facts such as the loss of confidence in the judicial system, the loss of 
the monopoly in the legitimate use of force by the state, the lost of the well-being of the 
population, and the opportunity and transactional cost for society loss. In other words, the 
real cost of terrorism and violence are underestimated due to difficulties in calculating it. 
2 
The case of loss of opportunity cost due to violence, if this 4.5 percent of the GDP 
loss could be oriented in population needs, the following be possible: (1) In one year 
educational coverage for 1,118,000 elementary students under 10 years of age out of the 
educational system today; (2) in only three years a solution to the national housing 
                                                 
1 The World Bank, “Violence in Colombia: Building Sustainable Peace and Social Capital,” 
Washington D.C., 2000, considered 4 percent of GDP. On the other hand, a report from the Colombian 
Department of Planning, September 9, 1999, considered 9 percent of GDP. 
2 Castro Manuel, Wartember Jorge and Celis Andres, “El Conflicto Armado: La Estrategia Económica 
de los Principales Actores y su Incidencia en los Costos de la Violencia, 1990-1998,” Essay, Grupo de 
Desarrollo y Paz de la Unidad de Planeación Rural y Urbana del Departamento Nacional de Planeación de 
Colombia, 2000. 
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deficit; or (3) in only two years the accomplishment of exploration, development and oil 
production needed for the next four years.3 
The subversives showed their ability in causing an unbalance in Colombia’s 
national economy through uncounted terrorists attacks against the economic 
infrastructure, as well as through many sieges against small towns and villages. These 
attacks caused internal migration, fueling social tensions and instability in the big cities.                               
The Colombian economic sector most affected by terrorism and violence is the oil and 
mining sector, Empresa Colombiana de Petroleos Nacionales (ECOPETROL) and its 
joint ventures with British Petroleum Company (BP), and the Occidental Oil Company 
which has sector negatively impacted the economy due to the accumulation of thousands 
of terrorist attacks against its infrastructure. 
In addition, the loss of profit derived from these attacks affect domestic 
investment, especially in those areas where exploration and operation are functioning. 
Without a doubt, the Colombian government is losing the opportunity to invest in other 
sectors of the national economy to incentivize employment and development, and to 
improve the conditions of its weak social security system, especially in health and 
education. 
Due to internal migration of violence, Colombia has passed from being an 
exporter to an importer of six million tons of foodstuff.  Abandoning rural areas because 
of forced displacement has ruined one of the most prosperous sectors of the economy. 
Finally, there is not doubt that the main fuel of the war in Colombia is the drug 
trade, since it is the primary source of financing for both the subversives and the 
paramilitary groups. The objective of narco-trafficking is obvious. Its illegal business will 
prosper to the extent that the state is incapable of suppressing the cultivation of coca and 
poppy and the establishment of laboratories processing cocaine and heroin. For this 
reason, the geography of the drug trade coincides almost exactly with the geography of 
war. This is precisely due to the drug trade flourishing in isolated and sometimes 
inaccessible jungle areas. 
 




 Colombia has tolerated for almost fifty years the oldest subversive movements in 
the region, but at the same time the country has showed stable economic growth up until 
1998. Now, in the face of an economic recession, which reached a negative GDP of –4.5 
percent in 1999, the puzzle is to establish which of the following variables: guerrilla 
violence, illicit drug trafficking, or the 1991 Constitution, have most affected economical 
stability.  The recession is defined by (a) a 20% unemployment rate (the highest in the 
Western Hemisphere), (b) a dramatic reduction of foreign investment, (c) socio-economic 
unrest (with the highest rate of violence in the world with close to 250,000 deaths in the 
last ten years of conflict (ANIF)4), (d) a severe brain-drain (almost three million 
Colombians left the country in the last decade, with 1.7 million as internal refugees), and 
(e) a state fiscal deficit that affects social security issues (especially in such areas as 
health, education, and regional pensions at the municipal level.) 
 This thesis will argue that guerrilla activity, reaching its peak of violence and 
terrorism in the last half of the 1990s, is the most important variable that impacts 
Colombia’s economy. The guerrillas through criminal actions, such as drug-trafficking, 
kidnapping, extortion, war-tax, theft, and the constant attacks on the infrastructure’s 
represent the loss of million of dollars in economic damage. 
 Illicit drug trafficking is the second most important variable that has affected 
Colombia’s economy, causing an economic domestic boom from 1985 until 1995. During 
this period of the Cali and Medellin drug-cartels, money-laundry and fictitious business 
infiltrated the economy. After Colombia’s military forces destroyed the drug-cartels, 
many businesses collapsed including real estate, construction, hotels, clubs, and luxurious 
stores serving as money-laundering centers, especially in Cauca Valley and close-by 
areas. 
Finally, the 1991 Political Constitution, the third variable, established many new 
economic responsibilities at the state level, aggravating the state fiscal crisis. The 
following areas affected the economy:  
                                                 
4 ANIF. Data from National Association of Financial Institutions of Colombia. 
1 
(a) A weak judiciary; the Courts fail at their basic functions of enforcing 
human rights and property rights but intervene at the highest levels of 
policymaking. Impunity, especially in homicides, provides Colombia with 
the highest murder rate in the world.  
(b) The conflict of interest between the law and the dynamics of the economy.  
The 1991 constitutional reform intended to insure independence of the 
monetary authority and exchange rate policy, but it did not become a 
reality due to political interests. 
(c) The separation of taxation and spending between different levels of 
government fuels severe problems of fiscal imbalance. This is due to the 
bulk of tax revenues collected by the Central Government but spent at 
municipal levels where subversion has intimidatory power to manipulate 
the way in which funds are spent.  
From the analysis of these three interconnected variables (guerrillas, drugs, and 
1991 Constitution), this thesis will identify the weight that each one represents in 
Colombia’s economic crisis by establishing priorities and identifying possible 
alternatives or solutions to mitigate their economic impact. By identifying variable 
weight, the required domestic effort, and the external support needed for Colombia to 
build a stronger economy can be established.  
2 
The thesis’ organization is as follows: Chapter II describes Colombia’s economic 
behavior in the last half of the 1990s. The chapter provides a definition of the actual 
economic recession in Colombia, showing data and analysis in areas, such as 
employment, the fiscal state deficit, the social security system, migration, the justice 
system, and the impact of the economic cost of violence and crime. This chapter also 
shows how the recession affected the economic growth and the socio-economic well- 
being of Colombians. Chapter III provides a description and analysis of how Colombia’s 
terrorist movements, Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), National 
Liberation Army (ELN) and Self-Defense Groups (AUC), permeated every aspect of 
Colombian government and civil society. This chapter also demonstrates how these 
organizations established broad-based underground economies with regular expenses, 
both in illicit economies and within Colombia’s formal economy. Finally, the chapter 
covers Colombia’s economic impact which caused these terrorist organizations. Chapter 
IV presents economic events in Colombia before and after the collapse of the Cali and 
Medellin drug-cartels, and the impact of the related economic boom on Colombia’s 
economy in areas, such as real state, construction, banking, and agro-industry through 
money-laundering operations. Chapter V will analyze the “economic” and “political” 
institutions established in the 1991 Constitution, and their impact on Colombia’s 
economy. Additionally, the chapter will focus on those economic institutions that deal 
with the bureaucracy and provision of social service: monetary and fiscal institutions 
(Central Bank), and finally the local/central government relationships. 
Using the data from Departamento Nacional de Planeacion de Colombia (The 
National Planning Department), Asociacion Nacional de Instituciones Financieras de 
Colombia-ANIF (National Association of Financial Institutions of Colombia), Federacion 
Nacional de Desarrollo-FEDESARROLLO, Defense Minister of Colombia-Reports-
2000, and World Bank Country Study, the thesis will focus on the last half of the 1990s 
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II. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF COLOMBIA’S ECONOMIC 
CRISIS? 
The economy of Colombia was especially recessive from 1998 to 2000, suffering 
at the same time from the intensification of its domestic conflict, the worst in the region. 
Colombia, like other countries in the region, has been confronting structural economic 
problems, such as the public sector deficit, the ballooning foreign debt, and, of course, 
the impact of globalization. However, violence and terrorism from guerrillas, 
paramilitaries, drug-traffickers and organized crime have been the key and the strongest 
factor in the recession.  
In fact, the guerrilla’s tactics of kidnapping, extortion, war-tax collection, and 
systematic attacks against the economic infrastructure (targeting cattle raising, oil, 
electrical-power, coal, gold mining, transportation, and distribution of goods) are 
disturbing factors that no other countries in the region tolerate. It is important to mention 
that from 1998 through half of 2001, 4,550 terrorist attacks were registered in the 
Colombian Army’s database. These attacks have been against infrastructure, and have 
affected oil pipelines, the mining sector, electrical-power plants, refineries, and 
transportation. The FARC, ELN and AUC forces have caused all of these attacks.5  
Moreover, the unpredictable outcome of the peace process with the guerrillas has 
caused a lack of domestic capital investments (because of uncertainty) worsening the 
economy of Colombia and putting its democracy in risk of collapse. The complex blend 
of drugs, guerrillas, and weak institutions, most of them incapable of enforcing the rule of 
law, represents a threat not only to Colombia’s economy and its democracy but for the 
whole region as well.  
This chapter will focus on describing the Colombian economic recession from 
1998 to 2000 by facts and analysis of macroeconomic data. This chapter will be 
organized into the following sections: (1) Colombia’s gross domestic product; (2) 
Colombia’s unemployment rate; (3) Colombia’s fiscal deficit; (4) Colombia’s principal 
social indicators; and (4) Colombia’s economic crisis from other perspectives.  
                                                 
5<  http://cambio.com.co/web/interior.php?idp=47&ids=1&ida > 
5 
Analyzing some data about Colombia’s socio-economics configuration is 
important to understand the crisis. In the case of this analysis, Colombia’s economy is 
broken into two periods during the 1990s. The first period, from 1990 to 1995, showed 
the end of the economic boom. The second period, from 1996 until present, showed the 
deterioration of Colombia’s economy having a great socio-economic impact on the 
quality of life. In this analysis, the different economic indicators are the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and its evolution in the last decade, the comparison between the GDP 
with the compound social indicators, such as the “Insatiable Basic Needs” (IBN), the 
“Human Development Indices” (HDI), the “Poverty Line” (PL), and the  “Employment 
Global Participation Rate” (EGPR).6 
 
A. COLOMBIA’S GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 1990s showed two definite periods as 
shown if Figure 1. The first period, from 1990 to 1998, indicated a positive and stable 
growth until a remarkable reduction in 1998. In contrast, the second period, which began 
in 1999 and characterized by its dramatic downward trend never seen before in the 
Colombia’s history, experienced a negative GDP of -4.5 percent. Consequently, in 1999 
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Figure 1.   Colombia:  The growth of its GDP in percentage (1990-1999) 
From: Departamento Nacional de Planeación de Colombia.

                                                 
6 Castro, de Posada Beatriz, “La Crisis Económica y Social de Colombia,” Departamento de Economía, 
Universidad Javeriana de Colombia, documento preparado para su distribución en XXIII International Congress of 
the Latin Americam Studies Association (LASA) 2001  
6 
B. COLOMBIA’S UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
Lora Eduardo pointed out that until 1990 Colombia has had the most protected 
labor laws of Latin America; however with law No. 50 of 1990 these protective laws 
were destroyed. Some of the protections destroyed by law No. 50 were the two-month 
trial period during which a new employee can not be fired, the ban against part-time 
employment, and, especially, the double retroactive cost for retirement pensions 
(cessation), and the high costs for dismissed workers. Law No. 50 additionally 
contributed Colombia’s recessive economy increasing the high unemployment rate due 
its extreme flexibility for hiring and firing. Figure 2 demonstrates the rate of 
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Figure 2.   Colombia:  Unemployment Rate 1990-1999 
From: National Data Department of Colombia 

C. FISCAL DEFICIT 
During the 90s, the GDP and the unemployment rate have discouraged 
Colombia’s economy.   Colombia’s fiscal deficit is another economic indicator that needs 
to be considered since it is the last macroeconomic indicator of analysis, showing two 
defined periods: a first period under acceptable standards, from 1990 to 1995, and a 
second period, from 1996 to 1999, which registered the worst indicators and grew 
without controls. In 1999, the fiscal deficit became exaggerated contradicting the 
government’s efforts. The government carried out a contrary policy: instead of closing 
                                                 
7 Lora Eduardo, Seminario Empleo & Economía, “Por que Tanto Desempleo? Que se puede Hacer?” 
Ponencia Seminario de Empleo & Economía, Bogota, Marzo 30, 2001 
7 
the fiscal gap, the government opened it in a disturbing manner.8 Figure 3 demonstrates 
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Figure 3.   Colombia:  Fiscal Deficit 1990-1999 
From: National Planning Department of Colombia 


D. COLOMBIA’S PRINCIPAL SOCIAL INDICATORS 
1. The Poverty Line (PL) 
The Poverty Line is the most alarming indices because it represents the 
percentage of the population that is living with an insufficient income unable to satisfy 
their basic food needs. In addition, the poverty line indicator shows a subdivision defined 
as the “Misery or Indigent Line”. This represents the Colombian populations who have 
limited access to basic food supply, which is below the minimum required level.  In the 
1990s, any improvement in the poverty line was minimal. Any results of the 
government’s efforts were perceived only after 1998. By 1999 the poverty line was going 
downward and showed indices equal to 1991 (53.8).9 Figure 4 represents the tendency in 
the 90s. 
                                                 
8Castro, de Posada Beatriz, “La Crisis Económica y Social de Colombia,” p. 07,  Departamento de Economía, 
Universidad Javeriana de Colombia, documento preparado para su distribución en XXIII International Congress of 
the Latin Americam Studies Association (LASA) 2001  
  
9 Castro, de Posada Beatriz, “La Crisis Económica y Social de Colombia,” p. 08,  Departamento de Economía, 
Universidad Javeriana de Colombia, documento preparado para su distribución en XXIII International Congress of 








PL 53.8 51.7 52.8 51.53 50.9 53.8
MISERY 20.4 19.4 18.7 18.37 17.96 18.74
1991 1993 1996 1997 1998 1999

Figure 4.   Colombia:  Poverty and Mesery Indices 1991-1999 
From: National Planning Department of Colombia 
Indicator System of Socio-Demography 

2. Insatiable Basic Needs 
The “Insatiable Basic Needs” (IBN) indicator measures the needs of the poor in 
relationship with five simple indicators: (a) School Absentism Rate (students between 7 
and 11 years old that do not attend school; (b) Critical Overcrowding (three or more 
people living in one room used as a dining and bedroom); (c) Inadequate Basic Sewers, 
Water and Electrical Power Supply;  (d) Inadequate Housing (precarious construction); 
(e) Economic Dependency (the relationship between the scholarly level and the head of 
the family’s income).10  
 
IBM Components  1985 1993 1997 1998 
School Absentism 11.50 8.02 4.11 4.50 
Critical 
Overcrowding 
19.40 15.40 11.25 11.20
Inadequate Sewer, 
Water& Electricity 
21.80 10.52 4.76 5.00 
Inadequate Housing 13.80 11.60 7.71 7.30 
Economic 
Dependency 
15.90 12.83 8.97 9.50 
National Total 45.60 37.20 25.40 25.90
Table 1.   Colombia:  Insatiable Basic Needs 1985-1998 
From: National Planning Department of Colombia 
                                                 
10 Nina Esteba, Aguilar Anna and Amartya Sen. “Estudio de la Desigualdad Económica y la Pobreza Monetaria 
Colombiana: 1978-1997,” Cuadernos de Economía No. 29, pp. 213-214 
9 
The IBN in table-1 shows a considerable reduction between 1985 and 1997 where 
a 20 percent reduction was reached. In contrast, by 1998 the IBN indicator rose in almost 
all its components but specifically in ‘economic dependency’ and ‘school absence’.  
These were the results of Colombia’s economy crisis. 

3. Colombia’s Human Development Indices 
The “Human Development Indices”   (HDI) is the most accurate indicator. It 
makes a comparison among 174 countries enabling the analysis of Colombia’s situation 
in the overall context. The HDI is the relationship among (a) life expectancy; (b) 
educational achievements (it is a function of adult literacy and scholarly rate—
elementary, high school, and university level); and (c) level of life (measure by the GDP 
per real capital). The indicator of HDI shows how much is needed for Colombia to 
achieve its defined goals, such as long life expectancy, total school national coverage, 
and high quality of life.11 
By 1990, the HDI had had a high indicator but later on switched to a medium 
indicator in the three following years. The HDI finally recovered in 1994 with a high 
indicator of HDI lasting until 1998. In 1996 Colombia was ranked 49th in HDI among 
174 evaluated countries by the United Nations. In 1996 Colombia’s HDI achieved its 
highest rating. By 1998 the HDI included a fourth dimension in its indicators: “social 
exclusion” affecting Colombia’s indicator in the next year. 
In 1999 the HDI indicator was 0.764, which, in the concept of the United Nations 
Developed Program (UNDP), means that Colombia was ranked 68th among 174 
countries evaluated. In other words, between 1997 and 1998 Colombia lost 11 ranking 
positions in the international arena. Several Latin American countries had a backward 
slide in HDI as a result of poor economic achievements.12 For instance, in 1997 seventy-
two people for each 100 people were studied, but in 1999 only 70 people for each 100 
people were studied. This represents a backward trend in this necessary factor for 
achieving a better quality of life.13 
                                                 
11 PNUD. Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano para Colombia 2000,  P. 44 
12 PNUD. Ibid, p. 45 
10 
13 Castro, de Posada Beatriz, “La Crisis Económica y Social de Colombia,” p. 08,  Departamento de Economía, 
After evaluating the traditional economic indicators discussed so far, it is 
important to follow with an analysis of  employment  because it contributes to reducing 
the poverty indices (PI) and improving human development.  In table 2 below, 
Colombia’s “Global Rate of Participation” (GRP), compares the “Economic Active 
Population” (EAP) and the “Population with Legal Age to Work” (PLAW)—without 
regards to being employed. 

 GRP Men Women 
1993 57.15 75.50 40.20 
1994 56.40 74.60 39.60 
1995 56.80 74.80 40.50 
1996 56.30 74.10 40.00 
1997 56.60 73.70 40.90 
1998 58.60 74.30 44.00 
1999 59.40 74.30 45.60 
 
Table 2.   Colombia:  Global Rate of Participation 1990-1999 
From: National Planning Department of Colombia 

 
The GRP has been rising, especially for women who switched from 40.2 in 1993 
to 45.6 in 1999. The men’s participation, however, went down in the same period from 
75.5 to 74.3. This explains an important link with Colombia’s skyrocketing 
unemployment as well as the lack of new jobs due to the economic crisis.  
Unemployment is not only a problem of supply but also is a problem of demand. 
The causes of the offer are migration, displacement by violence, demographic factors, 
and structural imbalance. The causes of the demand are microeconomic factors, wages, 
the high cost of dismissed employed, tax overload (Para-fiscal load) and economic 
growth.  
                                                 
Universidad Javeriana de Colombia, documento preparado para su distribución en XXIII International Congress of 
the Latin Americam Studies Association (LASA) 2001  
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The labor market, and monetary and fiscal policies are other factors contributing 
to unemployment according to Villar Leonardo14 from Colombia’s Republic Bank. 
From the point of view of demography, there is an incremental rate in the 
“Population of Legal Age to Work” (PLAW) that causes an incremental rate in the 
“Economic Active Population” (EAP), which has been rising swiftly since 1997.  As a 
consequence the EAP, ready to work, rose to a 4.3 percent annual rate; nevertheless, 
between 1991 and 1997 the annual rate of growth was only 3.3 percent.15 
These rates of population growth, linked to offer and demand causes, generated 
Colombia’s highest unemployment rate. Unemployment has greatly affected the young 
people due to their difficulties in getting a job. People between 35 and 40 years of age 
aggravated with it their economic situation spend an average of 6 to 8 months finding a 
new job. In the first half of the 1990s the required time to get a job was 2 to 3 months; 
however today, the time has more than doubled. This indicator corroborated the worst 
social condition and the increment of economic dependency.16 
The high unemployment rate started in 1996 but has been diminished by “the 
under-employment rate”, which functions as a palliative of unemployment. The under-
employment has grown reaching more than 20 percent. The under-employment 
corroborated the worst socio-economic condition for the Colombians because under-
employment was neither a permanent palliative nor a temporary solution.  

E. CONCLUSION 
Not only critical levels of violence and terrorism but also globalization impacted 
Colombia’s economy in the last half of the 1990s. Globalization has had a significant 
impact on the national economy due to Colombia’s uncompetitive, restricted markets and 
unstable commercial rules. Technology, human capital protection, and research and 
                                                 
14 Villar, Leonardo, ‘Indicadores de Política Económica,” Seminario de Empleo y Economía, Banco de la 
Republica de Colombia, 2000. 
15 Lora, Eduardo, Seminario Empleo & Economía, “Por que tanto desempleo?  Que se puede hacer?” Ponencia 
Seminario de Empleo & Economía, Bogota, Marzo 30, 2001 
16 Castro, de Posada Beatriz, “La Crisis Económica y Social de Colombia,” p. 17,  Departamento de Economía, 
Universidad Javeriana de Colombia, documento preparado para su distribución en XXIII International Congress  
of the Latin Americam Studies Association (LASA) 2001 
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development are practically absent from Colombia’s perspective. Moreover, corruption is 
another of Colombia’s key constraint to compete in open markets due to bribes and 
political interventionism in state contracts. To support corruption cases, managers, 
ministers, politicians and government officials siphoned off 365 billion Colombian pesos 
from 1994 to 2000 from different state institutions through contracts and loads, now in 
investigative trials.17  
In the case of unstable commercial rules precipitated Colombia’s housing crisis of 
1998-1999; in which 8,104 real estate properties (houses, apartments, and condos) valued 
at 545 billion Colombian pesos,18 were confiscated by the national banks. The decision 
by the Constitutional Court as well as high unemployment generated a collapse in the 
construction industry and in related businesses.  
Finally, the Congressional Research Services of U.S. has condensed Colombia’s 
crisis in these words: 
The many weaknesses of Colombia democracy are regarded by many as 
contributing to the very problems the country faces…. Many also blame 
the intransigence of economic interest and a lack of political will in severe 
successive government for the failure of subsequent attempts at agrarian 
reform and other rural improvements which would extended a central 
government presence to the countryside, and incorporate it into the 
democratic system. More recently, drug corruption is seen as not only a 
product of a weak democracy, but also as a cause of its continuing decline, 
and a complicate factor in any attempts to strengthen democratic 
institutions. Some fear that the poor economy may increase the 
significance of the drug trade to Colombia’s economy. According to a 
1998 estimate, income from illegal narcotics brought some $4 billion to 
Colombia, or 5 percent of the country GDP that year.19 
In the next three chapters, I will address the following questions: a) How do 
Colombia’s subversive movements affect the national economy? b) Is drug trafficking 
beneficial to Colombia? and c) Is the 1991 Constitution a real factor contributing to 
Colombia’s economic crisis? 
                                                 
17< http:://www.eltiempo.terra.com.co/11-06-2001> 
18 Data from ICAV (Instituto Colombiano de Ahorro y Vivienda: Inmuebles entregados en dacion de pago por 
la incapacidad económica  de pago de sus propietarios a los bancos. 
19 Serafino, Nina M., CRS Report for Congress, “Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options,” p. CRS-

































III. HOW DO COLOMBIA’S SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENTS 
AFFECT THE NATIONAL ECONOMY? 
This chapter will provide a description and analysis of how Colombia’s guerrilla 
movements –the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), the National 
Liberation Army (ELN), and the Colombian Self-Defense Union (AUC)—permeate 
every aspect of the Colombian government and civil society. The chapter will also show 
how these organizations established broad-based underground economies with regular 
budgets, in both the illicit economy and within Colombia’s formal economy. I will argue 
that the subversive economy has had a bigger impact on the national economy than 
previously to 1998.  
The analysis will show how violence and terrorism carried out by subversive 
organizations through massacres, mass kidnappings, extortions, murders, infrastructure 
attacks, and indiscriminate attacks against towns and their police stations have induced 
economic recession. The recession was first perceived at municipal level because 
peasants and cattle farmers left their ranches for the big cities, looking for security and 
shelter. Peasants become incorporated in the poverty belt of the cities due to a lack of 
education and opportunities, triggering urban insecurity.  
This chapter will also focus on the analysis and the implications of violence 
against Colombia’s economic legal sectors, such as oil and mining, transportation, and 
cattle agro-industry (one of the most important Colombian economic activities given its 
impact on the lifestyle of thousand of peasants’ families, and due to its nature as a 
primary food producers of beef as well as rice, cotton, coffee, bananas, and other staples). 
Additionally, this chapter presents data on the illegal activities conducted by subversive 
organizations, such as terrorism, sieged villages, massacres, murder and kidnappings. 
A. WHY HAS SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY ESCALATED? 
A lot of facts need to be considered in order to understand the increase in violence 
and terrorism during the last half of the 1990s, and the reason this escalation impacted 
Colombia’s economy. Different sources offer the following explanations: 
The FARC controls about 50 small ports in the Gulf of Uraba in Northern 
Colombia, through which it smuggles weapons and precursor chemicals for 
15 
manufacturing cocaine and heroin from Panama. The FARC and ELN control 
and administer about half of Colombia’s national territory. More than 57 
percent of the country’s major support them (David Spencer, “A Lesson For 
Colombia,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 9, No. 10, Oct. 1, 1997 p. 474).… 
They patrol the road and waterways, regulate fishing, and hold trials for 
suspected criminals. In some areas, they have created public services and 
agriculture credit banks and collect funds for road improvements at toll 
stations.20  
 
This means that the FARC has a geostrategic concept about the meaning of these 
external logistic lines of communication through which cocaine is exported and weapons 
imported. The permanent battle over the Gulf of Uraba’s control,  between the FARC and 
AUC, explains the strategic value of this region. Moreover, it is not easy for the 
Colombia’s police and military forces controling this vast area and its border with 
Panama due to the presence of swamps and everglades with multiple approach and 
escape avenues. The control of this region means power either in FARC or paramilitaries 
hands. 
 Since 1998, the intensity of Colombia’s guerrilla war has increased. 
On February 26, 1998, a Colombian army brigade was dispatched to 
break up a concentration of 600 guerrillas reportedly ready to attack 
Cartagena del Chaira near the Caguan River. The guerrillas organized 
a successful ambush. After three days, 80 soldiers had been killed, 43 
captured, and the rest dispersed in the jungle (David Spencer, “Bogotá 
Continues to Bleed as FARC Find their Military Feet,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, vol. 10, No.11, Nov. 1, 1998, p. 35).  This was 
the first time the FARC defeated a large, elite Colombian army unit in 
maneuver warfare.21 
 
 During the first week of August 1998, before Pastrana was 
inaugurated, the FARC and ELN launched at least 42 attacks in 14 
different sectors. More than half of these attacks involved guerrilla 
units of 300 to 1,000 fighters. After two weeks of fighting, 104 
military and police were dead and between 129 and 158 government 
troops had been taken prisoner; 243 guerrillas had been killed. On 
October 18, 1998, the ELN sabotaged Colombia’s main oil pipeline, 
causing a huge fire that destroyed the small village of Machuca; 45 
people were burned to death, and another 26 died later from several 
burns. (Radio Cadena Nacional, “ELN Rebels Continue attacks on Oil 
                                                 
20 Sweeney, John, “Tread Cautiously in Colombia’s Civil War,” March 25, 1999, p. 5, the Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder,” <http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1264.html>   
21 Ibid, p. 7 
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Facilities,” BBC Summary of World Broadcast, November 14, 1998). 
On November 2, 1998, the 120-man police detachment in Mitu, a town 
of 14,000 located about 400 miles from Bogotá near the border with 
Brazil, was assaulted by up to 1,000 FARC guerrillas who arrived by 
River. About 80 police and 10 civilians were killed, and 40 police 
were taken prisoner.22  
 
This means that the successful guerrilla attacks, in 1998, generated doubts about 
capabilities of government military forces. The subversives capability for mass force 
concentration, in space and time, by 1998 developed a strong opinion that the guerrillas 
was in route to take the big cities and the political power by force. By 1999, as a product 
of small guerrilla’s victories, a large amount of financial capital flew looking for secure 
shelter due to economic uncertainties. 
By 1998, Colombia’s armed forces—and particularly its army—grew 
significantly weaker due to First, the drug decertification of the Samper administration 
(1994-1998) that impeded the U.S. logistic military supplies needed for Colombian 
military forces to control the guerrillas and paramilitary escalation. This was a partial 
result of the Clinton administration’s refusal to provide military aid to Colombia’s 
military units if even one individual in a unit was suspected of abusing human rights. 
Thus, Samper’s administration was “a unique opportunity” for guerrillas to growth 
militarily, economically, and politically.  Additionally, Samper’s ties to the Cali drug 
traffickers gave the FARC and ELN an excuse to declare his administration illegitimate 
and to refuse engaging in talks. 
Second, as a result of not having a “National Defense Strategy” supported by 
Colombian Congress to confront the guerrillas’ escalation, Colombia’s army was weak in 
weapons, technology and in the number of fighters. The Colombian army was also 
fighting alone, since the civil society, the political parties, the Congress, and the media 
were simple observers of the confrontation against the FARC, the ELN and the 
paramilitaries groups. No real support was present for the army. Third, for a long time 
politicians and society believed that narco-guerrilla was not a matter for their concern; 
however, the escalation of kidnappings and systematic terrorist attacks against small 
                                                 
22 Sweeney, John, “Tread Cautiously in Colombia’s Civil War,” March 25, 1999, p. 7, the Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder,” <http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1264.html>   
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towns (from 1998 to 2001) put a lot of pressure on the civil society and its political 
misperception.  Finally, by 2001, the “National Defense Strategy” was approval by the 
Colombian Congress. 
Given the lack of legal employment opportunities in rural colonized areas, official 
coca eradication ultimately provided the guerrillas with an army of unployed young 
without prospects of futurejobs. This is partly responsible for the increasing number of 
recruits to the FARC since its founding in 1964. In fact, the FARC has developed a 
perfect plant of doubling its military force by the years 1995 and 2000 through targeting 
unemployed and uneducated youth in colonized and other poor rural areas. Table 4 
illustrates the increase in FARC’s military force. 
 
        
Year 
Number of fronts Number of Members
      
1986 
32 3,600 
     
1995 
60 7,000 
     
2000 
60 17,000 
Table 3.   The FARC’s growth from 1986 to 2000 
From: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Colombia 
 
As Vargas points out “the situation is aggravated by the government loss of 
legitimacy, stemming from its lack of government presence in isolated regions, which 
prevents the development of the legal economy and establishes in its stead a propitious 
infrastructure for illicit crops. Through the taxation of illicit crops, the guerrillas have 
grown in number and financial power.”23  
The bottom line is the historical inability of the Colombian government to be 
present in the rural sector where guerrillas organized. Another factor is  the difficulties 
                                                 
23 Vargas, Ricardo, “The FARC and The Illicit Drug Trade,” p. 6,  (TNI) Transnational Institute, The 
Netherlands, Accion Andina, Cochabamba, Bolivia, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 
Washington D.C., June 1999,  http://www.tni.org/drugs/pubs/farc.htm  
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faced by approximately 150,000 soldiers to control a vast territory of almost 1,400,000 
square kilometers, where rivers, jungle forest, huge valleys, high and abrupt mountains, 
and a poor net of communications isolated a multiethnic and multi-cultural society.  This 
complex geography and culture made military operations difficult. 
In the analysis of the subversive’s underground economy, it is important to 
mention how this economy is synchronized with the citizen’s lifestyle and their 
businesses; to do that, this thesis  uses Alfredo Rangel’s research—Colombia’s Economy, 
“Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection.” In Rangel’s viewpoint the 
recent economic prosperity of Colombia’s guerrillas groups place them among the most 
outstanding examples, at the international level,  of successfully self-financed insurgent 
groups. Colombia’s guerrilla groups have establish broad-based underground economies 
with regular expenses, coherent flows of income and systematized investments. In 
addition, the two main insurgent groups, the FARC and the ELN, have succeeded in 
designing and applying multiple strategies for acquiring and utilizing financial resources 
amounting to roughly  $1.5 million U.S. dollars a day.24 
In fact, as much as 80% of the FARC and ELN resources are not spent 
immediately on combat activity but on investments through figureheads in activities like 
(1) towns and cities through investment in small business in order to create intelligence, 
support network, and revenues; (2) at the national level, investment in big business or in 
financial sectors providing steady and secure cash flow; (3) at the international level; 
deposits in hard currency, for accessing the international black market of weapons, for 
financing  diplomatic activities, and for  maintaining the strategic resources necessary for 
meeting the demands of  internal warfare.25 
What is the impact of the guerrilla economy and its symbiotic relationship with 
the national economy? 
The guerrillas’ movement develops its activities extend beyond the local 
level and enter into regional and national spheres, moving from predatory 
                                                 
24 Rangel, Alfredo, Colombia: Guerra en el fin de Siglo. (Bogota; Tercer Mundo Editores, Universidad de los 
Andes, 1998) p.29 
25 Rangel, Alfredo, “Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection,” p.580, Economy of Colombia, 
Journal of International Affairs, Spring 2000, 53. No. 2 The Trustees of Columbia University in the city of New 
York. 
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tactics toward parasitic forms. Parasitic form is the closest definition about 
guerrilla’s economy.  In fact, in territories where guerrilla groups have 
been settled for periods up to 20 years or more, and where, in some cases, 
they arrived before other agricultural settlers, the guerrilla groups have 
been the first to establish a coherent economy. Part of the guerrilla’s 
success, entrenchment and longevity is attributable to its having been the 
first to build finished, politically –and administratively- delineated spaces 
in these territories, where population density is low, the state’s 
institutional presence is weak, and where commercial relations with the 
formal economy are precarious.26 
Such is the case in many coca –and poppy- farming areas. For instance, Caqueta, 
Putumayo, Arauca, Vichada, Amazonas, Vaupes y Guainia are the guerrilla’s preferred 
states where the government presence has been historically weak. In fact, in 1985, the 
guerrilla groups were present in 75 out of 1,000 municipalities in Colombia and by 1998, 
their presence was felt in nearly 600 municipalities.27 
In Rangel’s point of view, the guerrilla groups act as parasites on business and 
industries of great national importance in terms of their contribution to the GNP (banana, 
oil, coal). In fact, the guerrillas have simultaneously entered into a symbiotic relationship, 
which means “the insurgent economy became an integral part of the regional economic 
dynamic, to the degree that the formal distinction between legal and illegal activity 
vanished. This is true even while it is also possible that the guerrilla groups 
simultaneously develop an economy parallel to, but not integrated into the formal 
economy, thus depriving both state and society of the benefits of that economic 
activity.”28 The symbiosis means the interaction between the regional economic 
dynamics, the illicit cocaine economy, and the legal sectors, such as banking and finance. 
The income of the Colombian guerrillas may be as high as  $600 million U.S. dollars a 
year, or $1.5 million U.S. dollars a day.29 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Alfredo Rangel Suárez, Colombia: Guerra en el fin de Siglo. (Bogota; Tercer Mundo Editores, Universidad 
de los Andes, 1998) p.582 













Figure 5.   FARC’s Sources of Income 
From: Comité Interinstitucional de Lucha contra las Finanzas de la Guerrilla, 
1998 
 
In Figure 5, 48 percent of the FARC’s revenues come from its involvement in 
drug trafficking. “The FARC’s trafficking operation involves a taxation system which 
allows it to remove part of the economic surplus of regions where illegal drugs are grown 










Figure 6.   ELN’s Sources of Income 
From: Comité Interinstitucional de Lucha contra las Finanzas de la Guerrilla, 
1998 
                                                 
30 Rangel, Alfredo, “Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection,” Economy of Colombia, Journal 
of International Affairs, Spring 2000, 53. No. 2 The Trustees of Columbia University in the city of New York. 
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In Figure 6, the ELN obtained 61 percent of its income through extortion against 
the oil and mining sector, 29 percent from kidnapping, 6 percent from drug trafficking, 
and 4 percent from cattle theft.31 
In regards to drug trafficking, it is estimated that the FARC manage to collect 
taxes on 80% of all cocaine production, close to $140 million U.S. dollars a year, making 
this is primary source of income.32 In fact, the FARC has established an entire taxation 
system, which allows it to remove part of the economic surplus of regions where illegal 
drugs are grown, processed and exported. 
The taxation structure (the symbiosis between the insurrection and regional 
economies) functions as follows: (1) In the extensive areas where the coca plant is grown 
and cultivated (taxed according to the size of their crops); (2) At the entry of processing 
material where check-points on land and water in route to the refineries are taxed per ton 
or gallon of the materials used in the refinement process-- acetone, ether, sulfuric acid, 
gasoline, cement; (3) At the transportation-net on the final product. (air, land and water 
taxation); (4) At the control zones on the interior where cocaine is exported to the foreign 
market for consumption.   How does the taxation process work? First, the refineries pay 
according to the weight of the product (heavier on the final product –pure cocaine). The 
tax is known as ‘gramaje’ that means 10% of the price of the product in the region: 
Second, there is a tax on the maintenance of the laboratories, on the landing strips, on the 
transit of aircraft carrying production materials or finished product itself (cocaine).33 
Consequently, the group revenue of the FARC may be rising as a result of (1) 
their own coca growing activities; (2) their suppression of intermediaries; (3) the forcible 
monopolization of coca-leaf purchase; (4) the construction of their own coca-paste 
refineries; and (5) the construction on landing strips on the group’s own property. 
Moreover, the FARC established a minimum wage for coca leaf pickers, and a minimum 
price for the leaf, which middlemen and refiners must pay to farmers. In this way, the 
FARC are regulating the labor supply and setting prices on the coca-pasta for processing 
                                                 
31 Comité Interinstitucional de Lucha contra las Finanzas de la Guerrilla, 1998. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Rangel, Alfredo, “Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection,” p. 528, Economy of Colombia, 
Journal of International Affairs, Spring 2000, 53. No. 2, Columbia University of  New York. 
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cocaine. In sum, the guerrillas’ ability to collect taxes depends upon their reaching 
equilibrium between public acceptance and the fear they instill by enforcing their rules 
and inflicting punishment. Penalties are typically fines, expatriation or death. Part of the 
FARC’s successful tax collection depends on the community control exerted.  Rangel’ 
states, 
The FARC also have established community rules to which the public is 
subject, including regulating liquor sales, prohibiting drug use, setting 
hours of operation for businesses, rules and seasons for hunting and 
fishing and fixing a minimum of staple crops on coca farms. Likewise, the 
guerrilla groups have assumed the role of the police, monitoring adherence 
to these rules and arresting violators, as well as of the judiciary, resolving 
a wide spectrum of civil disputes among the populace, ranging from 
marital disagreements to disputes between landowners over property 
lines.34 
 
On the other hand, how does extortion affect the extractive sector?  The oil 
industry pays over  $40 million U.S. dollars a year in extortion to the Colombian 
guerrillas groups.35 In the case of the ELN, a portion of these sums is collected in the 
form of infrastructure built by the civilian population and financed by the oil companies. 
The destruction of the pipelines that transport crude oil to shipping ports has been an 
effective tool in pressuring companies to pay. Interrupting the flow of crude oil can mean 
great financial losses or even expulsion from the market for non-delivery of orders. 
Between 1986 and 1996, the guerrillas have made 985 attacks on the infrastructure of the 
oil industry.36 
In the gold mining sector, the guerrillas receive close to $10 million U.S. dollars 
annually.37 Payments are made monthly and the rates depend not on the quantity of 
production but on the type of equipment and machinery used by the mine, this is due to 
the large companies, small businesses, and small-scale miners operating simultaneously 
                                                 
34 Rangel, Alfredo, “Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection,” p. 528, Economy of Colombia, 
Journal of International Affairs, Spring 2000, 53. No. 2, Columbia University of  New York. 
35Comité Interinstitucional de Lucha contra las Finanzas de la Guerrilla, Informe 1997, Bogota, 1998.  
36 Revista del Ejercito Nacional de Colombia, Bogota, July 1999, p.13 
37 Comité Interinstitucional de Lucha contra las Finanzas de la Guerrilla, Informe 1997, Bogota, 1998.  
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in the same area. Shops, small mills, and cantinas in these areas are not exempt from 
paying  taxes.  
From the extortion in the coal mining industry, the guerrilla groups’ income from 
coal mining areas total around $120 million U.S. dollars.38 Freight vehicles pay an 
extortion tariff according to the size of their loads and the number of axles of each truck. 
Every month, each mine pays a percentage of its total production. 
However, the guerrilla groups extortive activities extend to other sectors also, 
such as the transportation industries, where those who operate on land or on Colombia’s 
rivers (freight and passenger sectors) have to pay.  Reluctance to pay these tariffs may be 
punished by destroying the company’s vehicle, or occasionally, by impounding it. 
Shippers of food and beverages that regularly supply remote regions where guerrilla are 
present must pay an arranged sum in order to operate in those regions. Colombian 
commercial and manufacturing sectors are also the targets of pressure from the insurgent 
groups, not only in areas experiencing guerrilla control or expansion, but also even in 
urban areas where their presence is marginal and exists in the form of “small militias”.39  
The current Colombian domestic conflict is highly concentrated in farming areas. 
In these areas, violence is causing social disruption and vast economic damage in 
productive sectors such as livestock. This sector spreads out over 800,000 productive 
ranches. It has been the most affected business because of human rights violations, 
kidnapping, extortion, theft, and other forms of intimidation of subversive movements, 
which target the cattle ranchers.  
In Bejarano’s research, extortion is one of the guerrillas’ main forms of parasitic 
activity against the formal economy. Bejarano points out about cattle extortion: 
It is sometimes a step before kidnapping, if a victim does not pay the 
extortionist.  If the owner decides to pay the extortionists, he receives in 
exchange a guarantee that his life will not be threatened and that his 
property will be protected against cattle theft, property invaders, and other 
thieves and extortionists. The extortion of cattle ranching and agriculture 
sectors known as “vacuna”, or bovine extortion, is a result of an economic 
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census to establish the tribute that rural owners must pay, depends upon 
the depth of patronage in the region, on the size and production of the 
state, on the degree of cooperation or antagonism between the owner and 
the local guerrilla fronts.… The methods of extortion are a fixed annual 
monthly sum or a function of sales or production. Paid at more or less 
predictable intervals this allowed the guerrillas’ to budget their cash flow 
and resources through the year. .…this systematic cattle theft is another of 
the Colombian guerrilla steady sources of income. In 1994 the FARC stole 
over 125.000 head of cattle worth around  $60 million U.S. dollars. Cattle 
ranchers lost almost 1/3 of their annual production to the theft by 
guerrillas groups.40  
 
The “Federacion Nacional de Ganaderos de Colombia” (Colombia’s National 
Federation of Cattle Ranchers) reported in the first half of 2001 that 19 cattle ranchers 
were assassinated, 319 were kidnapped, and 57 billion Colombian pesos ( $26,7 million 
U.S. dollars) were transferred to guerrilla movements for intimidation purpose. In 
addition, the monthly extortion, “guerrilla vaccination”, cost for the cattle ranches to 
survive was raised 54 billion Colombian pesos for the first half of 2001.  
Indeed, cattle theft and “cattle sacrifices” (a punishment against ranchers that 
refused to pay the monthly extortion) raised 48 billion Colombian pesos, the equivalent 
of 64,500 heads of cattle lost.41 Therefore, the high cost is represented in lost competitive 
opportunities in the global market place. The ranchers who are away from their livestock 
--as a result of subversive intimidation-- are paying a high cost in productivity. The cattle 
raisers developed “the video-auction” technique for managing their livestock from the 
cities and for doing business under a favorable secured environment due to the 
intimidator presence of subversives around their properties.  
Thus, the economic impact of violence is measured: by a dramatic reduction in 
livestock, lost job opportunities, less heads of cattle, higher mortality of cattle, less milk 
production, and the reduced supply for market needs. In the first half of 2001, the 
economic cost of all these factors was equivalent to 185 billion Colombian pesos.  
Finally, the total cost in the livestock sector due to violence and terrorism (from the 
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subversive movements FARC and ELN) was 346 billion Colombian pesos ($160,9 
million U.S. dollars) by the first half of 2001.42 
Figures 7 through 10 represent the economic cost in livestock in the last two years 
and first half of 2001. Factors are represented as kidnapping, extortion, theft, and the lack 
of administrative control over the cattle ranches. Between 1999 and 2000, there was an 
incremental cost of violence.  The forecast for all of 2001 could be worse since the total 
















Figure 7.   Economic Cost in Livestock as a Result of Kidnapping (Billion of pesos) 
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Figure 8.   Economic cost in Livestock as a Result of Extortion (Billion of peso) 
From: Federación Nacional de Ganaderos de Colombia, 2001 
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Figure 9.   Economic Cost in Livestock as a Result of Theft (Billion of pesos) 
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Figure 10.   Economic Cost in Livestock as a Result of Lacking Administrative Control on 
Ranches (Billion of pesos) 
From: Federacion Nacional de Ganaderos de Colombia, 2001 
Furthermore, the public sector is not immune to extortion by the guerrilla groups 
either. The subversives’ political strategies are to control small local government so the 
guerrilla groups are able to dictate the allocation of public funds and investments in the 
city. Often, the guerrillas decide which companies are to be given contracts for public 
works, such as bridges, roads, and the town square. These companies must pay the 
guerrilla groups as much as 10% of their contracts. Thus, a portion of the public funds 
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end up in the hands of the guerrilla, which may include as many as 20% of all city 
administration in the country. At last, the insurrection receives somewhere between 5% to 
10% of funds destined for public works.43 
The worst economic tactic of guerrillas is kidnappings. Today nearly half of all 
kidnappings in the world take place in Colombia, where guerrillas groups carry out over 
half of these kidnappings, and the rest are carried out by organized crime gangs. The 
Colombian case may be the only one in which insurgent groups have used kidnapping as 
a source of income in such a massive and systematic manner.  In fact, the Colombian 
guerrillas groups gain almost 25% of their income through kidnapping. For the FARC, 
kidnapping is the third greatest source of income, after drug trafficking and extortion, 
whereas for the ELN,  it is second only to extortion.44 
However, the socio-economic status of targeted kidnapping victims has been 
gradually descending; today any member of the middle class can be a victim of some 
form of kidnapping. Advanced computer and communication technologies are used to 
select the victim, thanks to their consolidated financial structure, the guerrillas have been 
able to computerize their operations and employ the most advance communications 
technology. 
Guerrillas also are able to access classified files from government offices that 
have updated their system in order to facilitate electronic processes as tax payment and 
notary transactions. There is evidence that the databases of Colombia’s financial system 
and public records offices and even large supermarkets chains that use credit cards are 
being infiltrated by agents of the insurrection or by hackers who acquire the information 
and then sell it to the guerrilla groups.45 
Another technique for getting guerrillas’ ransom is to detain hundreds of cars on 
the highway outside of the big cities, and then use databases on laptop computers to 
select their victims one by one, based on the information at their disposal. The average 
ransom for individually selected Colombian victims is close to $100,000 U.S. dollars, and 
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for foreigners the ransom can be up to 15 times that amount. It is estimated however, that 
the guerrilla groups have sufficient capacity to have nearly 500 people in captivity at any 
given time, so that even as ransom amounts are negotiated and people are set free, others 
are being capture in order to keep the operation running constantly at maximum 
capacity.46  
 
B. THE GUERRILLAS’ PROFIT  
The question now is where  the guerrillas’ profit is going? Guerrilla groups have 
at their disposal over $300 U.S. million dollars a year for investing both inside and 
outside the country.. A large amount of money is sheltered by many sectors of the legal 
economy: the banks; commercial enterprises;  the stock exchange; food suppliers; the 
cattle and food industries; small business,  such as drugstores and groceries; food-related 
services, such as chicken rotisseries; gas stations for high cash-flow and money 
laundering. These businesses create intelligence and support networks for those  
collaborating with them. 
These economic systems guarantee the security of the insurrection and its 
invulnerability from state action. The insurrection’s clandestine political and  illegal war 
against the state demands that the organization be hermetic in its affairs and that its 
financial activities keep a very low profile. In reference to guerrilla’ investments, Rangel 
has pointed out 
Over the last 15 years guerrilla groups have been developing a complex, 
sophisticated money-laundering structures of other crime organizations 
such as the drug cartels. This system affords the insurrection security and 
invulnerability to action by the state. The insurrection’s clandestine 
political action and its illegal war against the state demand that the 
organization be hermetic in its affairs and that its financial activities keep 
a very low profile... In sum, it is estimated that the insurrection’s bank 
accounts are worth millions of dollars at home and abroad and that the 
insurrection has probably acquired part ownership of large Colombian 
businesses through its activity in the stock market. 47  
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 Even so, the Colombians and multinationals are paying those expenses destined 
exclusively for the maintenance of the FARC’s terrorist forces through different 
intimidation taxes, such as kidnapping ransom, extortion, cattle theft, an others. The 
forcible tax contribution are financing the guerrilla’s expenses, in areas like (1) the 
purchase and maintenance of their military gear; (2) the supplies and food for the 
fighters; (3) the maintenance of their infrastructure; (4) the military industry by 
establishing a workshop; (5) subsidized cost for the treatment and recovery for those 
guerrilla fighters wounded in battle; (6) pensions for retirement guerrillas, and financial 
assistance for their families; and (7) the maintenance and operation of the aircrafts for 
rapid deployment of the commanders.48 
 
C. THE DATABASE OF COLOMBIA’S SUBVERSIVE VIOLENCE  
At this stage, we can  identify the negative impact of the guerrilla’s escalation on  
Colombia’s economy by using the database of Colombia’s National Police and the Joint 
Commmand of the Armed Forces. The two years of 1998 and 1999  are  rising critical 
periods of violence and terrorism that contributed indirectly to a negative (-4.5%) GDP 
by 1999. Furthermore, linking this negative GDP with globalization difficulties  
(globalization from 1991 has devastated broad sectors of Colombian industry and 
agriculture by competitive pressures of the world market) are possible drawing   
Colombia’s economic crisis map. Specifically, terrorist attacks,  attacks on population,  
massacres,  assassinations, and  kidnappings will be analyzed from the database. 
1. Terrorist Attacks 
Terrorist attacks are a resource used extensively by insurgent groups with the 
purpose of bringing about economic and political destabilization. The guerrillas are,  by 
far, the main agents responsible for the attacks against  Colombia’s economy, and power 
and road infrastructure. The ecological damage resulting from oil-pipeline infrastructure 
attacks is endangering the survival of many rural communities as a result of thousands of 
barrels of crude oil spilt into rivers and waterways. The guerrillas have also  attacked the 
country’s electric power infrastructure: 232 power transmission towers in 1999. Figure 11 
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shows that during the last five years, guerrillas have increased the number of terrorist 
actions three-fold, reaching the unprecedented record of 718 attacks in 1999. There have 
been 2,824 terrorist actions during the last five years, all related to the internal conflict. 
Of these, 98.5 percent or 2,784 actions, were undertaked by guerrilla groups and 1.4 
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Figure 11.   TERRORISM  Number of cases:  98% by Subversive Groups, 2% by Illigal Self-
Defense Groups 
From: Joint Chief of Staff, December 31, 1999 
 
2. Attacks on the Population 
The  violent siege and taking of small rural populations by guerrilla fronts all over 
the country  is one of the actions generating the highest risk and the vast majority of 
International Human Rights Law Violations. Attacks increased five-fold during the last 
five years with 106 in 1999,  about 10 percent of Colombian municipalities, equaling  one 
siege every three days. During the course of these sieges on the  small rural population, 
the guerrillas use highly-inaccurate, oblique fire, which is a type of non-convetional 
weapons of mass destruction, causing dozens of casualties and wounded among the civil 
population. These weapons, additionally, caused  the indiscriminate destruction of 
houses, schools, entire villages, health care centers,  religious temples and  other civil 
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infrastructure to provoke mass exodus. Illegal self-defense groups attacked 9 villages 
during 1999. Figure 12 shows that between 1995 and 1999, guerrilla and illegal self-
defense groups combined attacked 260 groups in the population. The guerrillas were 
responsible for 246 (94.6 %) of the attacks, and the illegal self-defense groups for the 
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Figure 12.   SEIGED VILLAGES Number of cases:  94% attacks by subversive, and 6% by 
Illegal Self-Defense Groups 
From: National Police, December 31, 1999 
3. Massacres 
In Colombia a “massacre” is defined as a homicidal action in which there at least 
four deaths. During the last five years, the number of massacres attributed to insurgent 
and illegal self-defense groups has increased 4.3 times, growing from 128 in 1995 to 551 
in 1999. The main factor behind this growth rate is the illegal self-defense groups  
responsible for 74 percent of all massacres in 1999. Guerrilla groups were responsible for 
the remaining 26 percent. As a result of the dirty war between the guerrillas and illegal 
self-defense groups, during 1999, every two days three people were massacred, two by 
the illegal self defense groups and one by the guerrillas. During the last five years, the 
                                                 




guerrilla and illegal self-defense groups combined committed 1,253 massacres. Of these 
massacres 56.1 percent or 704 cases, are atribbuted to insurgent fronts and the remaining 
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Figure 13.   Number of massacres Casualties (Massacres over 4 casualties) 
From: National Police, December 31, 1999 
 
4. Assassinations 
During the last five years, assassinations committed by groups living outside the 
law, and related to the internal conflict, have increased 3.5 times, growing from 485 cases 
in 1995 to 1,653 cases in 1999. Self-defense groups are the main reason behind the 
increasing number of assassinations. During 1999,  guerrilla groups were responsible for 
55 percent of the assassinations and illegal self-defense groups were responsible for the 
remaining 45 percent. Of the 3,903 assassinations commited during the last five years by 
these illegal groups, the rebels are responsible for 2,777 or 71.1 percent, and illegal self-
defense groups are responsible for 1,126 or 28.8 percent.52 
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Figure 14.   Civilian Killed  
From: Joint Chief of Staff,  February 2000. 
 
5. Kidnappings 
The guerrilla is the main actor behind this growth rate. The number of  civilians 
kidnappings by guerrillas increased 4 times its previous number with the purposes of 
extortion. Therefore,  increasing its share of the total number of abductions occurring in 
Colombia from 35 percent to 53 percent.  The FARC and the ELN are each responsible 
for 44 percent of the kidnappings while  other dissident groups are responsible for the 
remaining 12 percent. Of the total number of kidnappings by the two largest groups, 95 
percent of the victims are Colombian nationals, and 5 percent—about 72 people—are 
foreigners; that is, the guerrilla kidnaps four Colombians a day,  and one foreigner every 
five days. Illegal self-defense groups started to kidnap for the purpose of extortion three 
years ago. They were responsible for 3.5 percent of the 2,991 abductions carried out 
during 1999 in Colombia. Common criminals were responsible for 42.5 percent of the 
kidnappings in the same year. During the last five years, illegal groups participanting in 
the Colombian armed conflict kidnapped 5.862 people, guerrilla groups kidnapped 5,668 
                                                 
 
34 
or 96.6 percent, and illegal self-defense groups 194 people or 3.3 percent.53 Figure 15 
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Figure 15.   KIDNAPPING TREND IN COLOMBIA  Number of Cases:  50% of Total 
Kidnapping Commited by Subversive Groups 
From: National Police,  December 31, 1999 

6. The War-Tax and Damage to the Rule of Law 
There are 84 Colombian municipalities where businesses are not allowed by the 
FARC to market beer, sodas, and refreshment beverages because the enterprises that 
produce and distribute them reject paying  the “FARC’s war-tax”. The war-tax was 
established in their law No. 002 payable by anybody  (individual or enterprise) whose 
assets are valued up to one million dollars.54  
Vargas points out the following about the FARC and its  illicit economy: 
One of the most significant changes in the guerrilla forces in the 1990s has 
been their increased control over local economic resources and increased 
fuel their war machine. Guerrillas have become economic reserves to 
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involved in the armed oversight of municipal budget administration, which 
has involved kidnapping and threatening mayors. They have also been 
active in gathering intelligence on resources administration at the 
departmental level. Kidnapping and extortion have become a major source 
of resources, targeting individuals such as politicians and executives from 
the petroleum, banana, commercial agriculture, and cattle industries. 
Finally, the FARC has profited tremendously from its multi-dimensional 
relationship with segments of the illegal drug circuit.55 
The worst effect of the FARC’s intention to balkanize the domestic conflict is in 
the rule of law. There are more than 164 remote municipalities in which judges have left 
by subversive pressure. Recently in a letter to Colombia’s President the higher judicial 
courts demanded that protection for the judges be provided in these 164 municipalities 
where the application of the rule of law is practically impossible given subversive 
intimidation. In the regions where judges remain working, the capability of the state’s 
protection is weak, and in some cases witnesses of criminal actions have been killed.56 At 
the same time, the absence of rule of law is increasing the level of violence and 
Colombia’s massive internal migrations. The uncountable massacres, resulting from a tit-
for-tat spiral, are a nightmare in the countryside. These contributing facts are also 
increasing unemployment and the social unrest in the big cities. 
 
D. THE OVERALL IMPACT OF INSECURITY 
Figure 16 shows the impact of insecurity, including the activities of guerrilla 
groups and organized crime units, in the survey of entrepreneurs in different sectors: 31.4 
percent of businesses polled have been victims of theft; 18.3 percent have suffered armed 
robberies; 13 percent have been victims of violent acts;  13.1 percent have been victims 
of threats against their “personal integrity; 12.5 percent have been offered bribes; 8.5 
percent have had their property pirated; 4.0 percent have been extorted in some maner; 
and 2.8 percent have been subject to kidnappings.”57 
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Figure 16.   The Impact of Insecurity in Entrepreneurs of Defferent Sectors 
From: Revista Poder y Dinero, p.104, Bogota, Colombia,  1997 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The negative  macroeconomic effects on the insurrrection are  
(1) the companies are forced to make additional efforts beyond what they would have 
under normal secure conditions in order to compete with foreign firms;   
(2) the illegal activities create greater uncertainty in terms of property rights and 
increase the cost of transactions in the economy, discouraging ongoing 
production;   
(3) the crime is an additional tax that reduces production incentives and brings with it 
an increase in production cost which, in the long term, reduces the volume of 
production;  
(4) the resources allocated to the protection of property have and adverse effect on 
total factor productivity;  
(5) every year Colombian society spends millions of pesos in private security to 
lower the risk of attacks on people and property; 
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(6) part of the public spending must cover the additional cost of maintaining an active 
military to try to contain the expansion of the guerrilla groups;  
(7) the economic inefficiency caused by resulting uncertainty and risk;  
(8) the negative effects of insecurity on investments, technological changes, 
productivity and administration.58  
As a final note, it is  important to consider the indirect effects of subversion at the 
aggregated level which is estimated at nearly 4 percent of the Gross National Product or 
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IV. IS DRUG TRAFFICKING BENEFICIAL FOR COLOMBIA? 
This chapter presents an overview of how drug-cartels, specifically from the 
1970s to 1990s, negatively impacted Colombia’s economy. Drug-money has corrupted 
the Colombian social net, changed moral values, manipulated Colombia’s Congress, 
executive and judicial system through bribes, fueled social tensions, and penetrated the 
traditional socio-economic “equilibrium” of the exclusionary Colombian democracy. 
The chapter argues that drug-profit is inherently a criminal activity, without real 
output that is valuable for Colombian society. After more than thirty years of illicit drug 
trafficking Colombia is confronted with an economic recession and social turmoil.  
Contrary to this, the underground drug-economy production benefits those who engage in 
it: guerrillas, paramilitaries, smugglers, weapons’ traffickers, landlords, and money- 
laundering enterprises; all of these have the power to intimidate Colombia’s weak civil 
society.  On the whole, it is estimated that drug-related violence currently accounts for a 
high proportion of the country’s 30,000 annual murders, one of the highest rates of any 
country outside a war zone and more than double the number of murders recorded in the 
United States during 1998.60  
The chapter analyzes: (a) the evolution of Colombia’s drug cartels; (b) the drug 
trade’s escalation and its relationship with the economy and narco-politics; (c) the size of 
the underground drug economy; (d) the national cost of the drug industry; and (e)  
Colombia’s war against drugs: actions and results, concluding that after many historical 
efforts between the U.S. and Colombia to reduce the traditional drug-cartels’ influence 
and power, the new drug actors; FARC and white-collar traffickers are, in fact,  
worsening the drug-war outcomes by conducting their businesses in a complex, bloody, 
and asymmetric fashion. 
A. THE MEDELLIN AND CALI DRUG CARTELS: EVOLUTION AND 
THREAT TO COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENTS 
In the 1980s and 1990s the drug industry permeated Colombia’s economy, 
imposed its criminal rules, and encouraged the collapse of institutions and the Colombian 
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civil society. From this moment, the oldest exclusionary democracy61 in Latin America, 
Colombia has been under siege. In the last twenty years, Colombia’s history of illicit drug 
trafficking has been an accumulation of corruption, terrorism, urban and rural violence, 
environmental damage, lawlessness, underground economy, smuggling, money 
laundering, paramilitary violence, internal refugees, increased political power of drug-
kingpins, as landlords, against agrarian reforms, congressional political cynicism, loss of 
public confidence, a financial crisis, and a progressive intimidation of society by the 
drug-cartels and their clandestine power. The confluence of these intricate factors has 
impeded sustainable economic growth in Colombia, and denied the development of a 
prospective state vision, where medium and long-range national goals are achievable. 
In regards to the evolution of the drug-trade, “the deployment of the U.S. Peace 
Corps contributed substantially to popularizing the use of marijuana and some varieties of 
mushrooms in Colombia during the 1960s. However, until the early 1970s the production 
and trafficking of these marijuana did not become significant.”62  Drugs became an issue 
in U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s, when President Nixon announced the first “war 
against drugs”. At that time, the U.S. and Mexican government agreed to use the 
chemical “Paraquat” to destroy Mexican marijuana crops, creating a supply shortage. 
This operation raised the profile of Colombia as a new marijuana supplier and opened 
U.S. as a new market for Colombia’s mafia –an early example of the balloon effect. By 
the 1970s Colombia produced and exported “Santa Marta Gold” marijuana --highly 
reputed in the U.S. streets. 
If the Colombian economy during the administrations of Lopez (1974-1978) and 
Turbay (1978-1982) administration showed an important development, it was the rapid 
growth of the underground economy associated with the illegal drug industry. Since the 
Colombian legislation was prone to issuing flexible laws that allowed the return of “flight 
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capital”, the drug-cartels exploited the opportunity by flooding the financial market, and 
domestic businesses with “dirty money”.  The tactic used, with significant evidence, was 
export over-invoicing, import under- invoicing, and other forms of laundering illegal 
foreign exchange.63 Ibanez (1974) states, “In a study of possible implications of the 1974 
tax reform in Colombia, estimates about one-third of the states sales taxes had been 
avoided prior to the reform.”64 Using estimates of the GDP and income distribution, 
Ibanez established that the income reported in tax return was only about one-third of the 
total reportable income. This means that, in the 1970s, Colombia did not have an efficient 
internal revenue service that allowed control over tax collection since neither central nor 
local control existed. For a long time evasion was Colombia’s economic rule of law. 
Not only the lack of accountable systems and audit controls, but also the lack of 
punishment against tax-violations were its principal characteristics. Thus, Colombia was 
an “offshore fiscal paradise” due to the lack of financial and custom control, allowing 
money laundering and the growth of power for the drug-cartels inside Colombia’s 
economy. 
The Turbay administration (1978-1982) took office in August 1978, when it 
confronted the U.S. over drug policy. President Carter pressured the Colombian 
government to spray  “Paraquat” chemical over marijuana plantations. Instead, Turbay 
began a campaign of manual eradication and interdiction that avoided the use of 
defoliants and herbicides. The campaign was considered quite a successful alternative at 
that time. Since eradication and controlling drug production has been the preferential 
U.S. policy since this period. However the U.S. primarily prefers ‘aerial spraying’ as the 
most effective, but it has a high economic cost.  Others have argued that ‘manual 
eradication’ is less expensive and adds social value. These techniques are still a 
controversial issue between Colombia and U.S. today. 
In the 1980s, the U.S. and Colombian interest converged in fighting drug 
trafficking. In 1982,  President Ronald Reagan declared another war on drugs and 
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unveiled plans to “launch a ‘full-scale’ attack against abuse at home and production, 
processing, and trafficking abroad.  National Security Directive 221 of April, 1986, states 
that ‘drug production and trafficking comprised a threat to the security of the 
Americas’.”65 Clawson, Patrick and Lee, a research team on drugs, explained the 
relationship between drug-production and U.S. policy in the following way:  
The growing U.S. demand for cocaine in the early and mid-1980s 
precipitated major organization changes in the Colombian cocaine 
industry. Production and transport were revolutionized. The “mule” 
system was discarded and replaced with fleets of aircraft that could carry 
loads of 400 to 1000 kilograms of cocaine. By the 1990s, traffickers were 
using merchant shipping, cargo jet aircraft, and semi-submersible vessels 
to export multi-tons load of cocaine to foreign markets.66  
In Betancourt’s administration (1982-1986), the illegal underground economy had 
grown so much that it had to be recognized as a police issue for government security 
forces. This led to the involvement of Colombia’s military forces in anti-drugs 
operations, fueling social conflict especially in areas where marijuana was being planted.  
As Thoumi argues, 
Unfortunately, the Betancourt’s administration is likely to be remembered 
not by the relative success of its economic policies but by increased 
general violence levels, including open conflict between the illegal drug 
industry, guerrilla organizations, and the state.67 
One of the most violent episodes in Betancourt’s administration was the 
assassination of the Colombia’s Minister of Justice, on the orders of drug-kingpin Pablo 
Escobar. Another example was the dramatic takeover by the M-19 guerrillas of the 
Colombia’s Supreme Court building  –where dozens of files that incriminated Medellin’s 
Drug-Cartel were stored, resulted in massive casualties among the Supreme Court 
members, and the burning of the judicial-files.68 This was the first bitter episode where 
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drug-cartels and guerrillas challenged Colombia’s state through the use of violence and 
intimidation. Large that the alliance between drugs and guerrillas became evident when 
the M-19 guerrillas group took over Colombia’s Palace of Justice on November 6, 1985. 
The link between drugs and guerrillas is an on-going difference between 
Colombia’s Military Forces and U.S. Congress because U.S. politicians have considered 
for a long time that drugs are not related with guerrillas’ businesses. Therefore the U.S. 
military assistance for Colombian forces has been restricted to confronting the subversive 
threat. (The controversial issue finished on September 11, 2001 when Taliban’s narco-
guerrilla showed their power as intimidators by the terrorist attacks. The attacks could 
have been fed with “dirty money” from heroin trafficking, as intelligence agencies 
reported.) 
On the other hand, Colombia’s history shows that the economic policy of the 
Barco administration impacted money laundering and drug trafficking (1986-1990). This 
economic policy, an “economic opening” package, relies on a trade liberalization 
program as its most important element while granting, at the same time, amnesty to those 
who have illegally acquired assets and income abroad. Thoumi writes, 
The international liberalization program lowered tariffs substantially and 
eliminating most non-tariff trade barriers. New policies also included the 
elimination of the “exchange control system” to free foreign exchange 
transactions and international capital flows, the weakening of restrictions 
on direct foreign investment, drastic changes in the labor code to make 
labor markets more flexible, and additional capital market liberalization 
measures.69 
 
In sum, Barco’s administration implemented another tax reform that simplified 
many taxes and eliminated tax biases against equity financing.  
Thoumi characterizes Barco’s policies as follows: “Amnesty provisions of this 
reforms were even more generous than those of the past, opening the door for the 
laundering of substantial amounts of illegal obtained funds. Those amnesties increased 
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short-term government revenues, but also legalized illegal income capital.”70 The tax 
amnesties have generated an evasive culture in Colombia, as citizens realize that tax 
amnesties –especially in case of fiscal emergency--were the key tool for government 
revenue increases. Thus, citizens have violated tax laws looking for future personal 
benefits (amnesty). Citizens have also make it easy for drug traffickers to bring their 
drug-profits from foreign financial markets, because the new policies eliminate  “the 
exchange control system” freeing foreign exchange transactions and international capital 
flows. Additionally, the weakening of restrictions on direct foreign investments by capital 
market liberalization measures, allows narco-traffickers to flood Colombia’s economy 
with ‘drug-money’, laundering it in the formal economy but without real capital 
investments. Thoumi’s argues this point: 
Barco’s administration has clearly gambled on the success of market 
liberalization policies to restore GDP growth rates to the 5 to 6 percent 
level… while official data indicate that legal exports as a percentage of 
GDP declined secularly from the 1920s on, it is not clear that this was the 
case during the 1970s and 1980s when marijuana and cocaine exports 
grew dramatically.…Foreign exchange revenues from these drug-exports 
that entered Colombia’s economy each year are likely to have been in the 
U.S. $1.5 to $2.5 billion range, indicating a substantial greater degree of 
international openness.71 
Government policies and economic institutions have economically assimilated in 
the underground drug economy.  In response to this interaction, Thoumi takes this 
position: 
During 1970s and 1980s it [money-laundering] was facilitated by periodic 
tax amnesties and holidays that the various governments implemented to 
increase [increasing] tax base, and by frequent loosening [of] the 
requirements regarding the sale to the Central Bank foreign exchange 
earnings attribute to service exports. Then, the grown [growth] of the 
underground economy has made it difficult to separate “clean” and “dirty” 
illegal capital and income, to the point that any policy aimed at bringing 
above ground illegal “clean” capital opens the door for “dirty” capital 
legalization.72 
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However, in Gaviria’s administration (1991), drug trafficking reached its 
maximum momentum in relationship with intimidation, corruption and threat. In his 
administration, the rule of law was abandoned--after several terrorist attacks-- for the 
convenience of the drug kingpin, Pablo Escobar, and the Medellin cartel:  
In early September 1990, the Gaviria’s government announced a major 
new peace initiative. The government would offer drug dealers the option 
of accepting sentences reduced by one-third and guarantees against 
extradition to the U.S. on the condition that they surrender to the 
authorities, confess to all their crimes in Colombia and abroad, and 
identify criminal assets and proceeds –laboratories and bank balances, for 
example. If they cooperate in the identifying the other perpetrators of or 
participants in the confessed crimes, and in revealing the value of the 
property reported to the judges, their sentences would be cut by an 
additional one-sixth.73 
Thus, the legal and judicial institutions of Colombia were targeted by the 
corruption of Medellin cartel, the worst example of this occurred when Pablo Escobar 
surrendered under the following unorthodox conditions: (1) the prison being located in a 
city where the traffickers enjoyed great influence, in Envigado Antioquia; (2) Escobar 
himself contributing $2 million US dollars to the construction of the prison’s and the 
money being funneled through the Envigado municipal treasury; (3) Escobar and his 
representatives being allowed to screen the guards responsible for internal security in the 
prison; (4) The prison itself being equipped with fax machines, cellular telephones, and 
computer, allowing Escobar to manage bank accounts and business transactions, and  
communicate with subordinates.74 
Through high-level corruption, Escobar escaped with nine of his fellow prisoners. 
This resulted in a government manhunt for Pablo Escobar, with in depth support from the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of the U.S.  Finally, in 1993 with valuable 
information from the Cali cartel, Gaviria’s administration successfully liquidated 
Escobar, ten years after the trafficker had become a fugitive from justice. Then, in 1995, 
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the Cali cartel surrendered under Samper’s administration, causing more political and 
moral damage than the terrorism of the Medellin cartel did.75 
Nonetheless, the breakup of the Cali and Medellin drug cartels did not lead to a 
long-term decline in Colombian drug trafficking. In contrast, these drug syndicates have 
since been replaced by smaller, more vertically integrated trafficking organization whose 
lively, independent memberships are much more difficult to detect and infiltrate. These 
traffickers employ new and constantly changing shipping routes through Central 
America, Mexico, and the Caribbean for moving cocaine and, increasingly, heroin.76  
Moreover, in addition to the small traffickers that appeared after the cartels 
collapse, the 17,000-member guerrilla army of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), an organization that had protected drug-cartels’ operations in 
plantations, laboratories and domestic routes, took final control over coca plantations in 
Colombia’s southern jungle. Today, the FARC is considered the biggest drug-cartel of 
the world.   In addition other criminal organization appeared having profited from 
narcotics in areas out off guerrillas control, including Colombia’s Self-Defense Union 
(AUC) or paramilitaries.  The Self-Defense Organization acts periodically as facilitators 
of the drug business to raise funds, or other times as drug producers.  
Briefly, drugs have been an important foreign policy issue between the U.S. and 
Colombia since the 1970s. The controversy about eradication techniques subsists, as well 
as the controversy between U.S. advisors and Colombian security forces about the 
strategic focus that must be implemented in the drug-war; some argue that focus must be 
on the productive side, while others say that it must be on the demand side. On the other 
hand, Colombia’s economic policy, due to historical ambiguity, has been contributed, in 
an indirect way, to money laundering and the prosperity of drug cartels. 
B. DRUG TRADE ESCALATION: THE ECONOMY AND NARCO-
POLITICS RELATIONSHIP 
The symbiosis between politicians and drug-traffickers has been very complex; it 
also involved the country’s business elite who proved to be vulnerable and complicitous. 
                                                 




They often accepted payments in cash, facilitated money-laundering operations through 
legitimate businesses, and sold properties at exorbitant prices. Without the acquiescence 
of some business people elite with low profiles, the money laundering operations would 
have been impossible in Colombia’s economy during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. 
Thoumi’s research has pointed out that 
Business associations in illegal contraband markets (known as “San 
Andresitos” shopping centers) have used the political clout afforded by 
their numbers to obtain from local government public services, and police 
protection despite the flagrantly illegal nature of their business. Their 
political strength is such, that politicians frequently seek their support, 
ignoring their illegal activities.”77   
For instance, donors from “San Andresitos” supported Samper’s presidential 
campaign in 1994. The National Direction of Custom and Taxes (DIAN, Spanish 
acronym) had tried to bring these illegal businesses --where money laundering is 
central— under control without results. The Samper’s questionable moral authority and 
his legislators impeded it.   
As Thoumi argues the “San Andresitos” phenomenon allowed drug-profit to 
increase/spread in small amounts of income, without risks. Transactions using cash 
instead of checks or credit/debit cards are the best way to launder money, with no receipt 
being issued for future government tax control.  
“Also services and non-durable consumer goods are attractive for laundry 
activities because they do not leave easily detected evidence of their use; assets for which 
the price is hard to estimates are also attractive, .”78 
The narco-politics relationship is well explained by Clawson, Patrick and Lee:  
 
The Cali drug lords asserted that the large number of political leaders were 
involved on some level with the drug trade and that the dons possessed 
evidence on [of] this involvement –tapes, documents, and photographs. 
The message was a clear blackmail threat. Apparently the threat did not 
succeed as the government achievement in putting Cali leaders behind 
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bars. Yet that achievement [achieved] was offset by a spate of accusations 
of political corruption against top Samper administration officials. “Moral 
terrorism” by the cartel was Samper’s explanation but the imprisoned Cali 
drug lords may have sought revenge against Samper and his colleagues 
leaking details of their financial contribution to the 1994 presidential 
campaign.79  
Despite years of trying to crush drug power, Colombia remains the world’s largest 
exporter of illegal cocaine. What has turned this running wound in the heart of Latin 
America septic is the link between narcotics smugglers and political groups of the left 
and right. In blurring the line between criminal and political activity, they have made 
much of Colombia ungovernable. As a result the drug cancer is spreading around the 
region.80  According to recent U.S. government reports, widespread corruption within all 
sectors of the Colombian government was a major factor affecting counter-narcotics 
operations. 
C. ESTIMATES ON THE SIZE OF THE UNDERGROUND DRUG 
ECONOMY 
Measuring the size of the underground drug economy is not and easy task. The 
statistical data is a product of methods of estimating. In the case of estimating 
underground economies, Vito Tanzini a research in economic issues, states:  
The estimates of the underground economy, expressed as percentage of 
GDP, provided by different studies using different methods, showed 
contradictory results, range from 1.4% to 31.4% for Canada, from 6.2% to 
19.4% for the U.S., and for Germany from 14.5% to 31.4% of GDP.81 
By the same token, overseeing Colombia’s drug profit is a complicated job, 
especially when account data lacks accuracy, and where small and medium private 
businesses, out of government tax control, have allowed for a long time drug-money 
overflow, and laundering activities. 
Evaluating the potential production of drugs in Colombia is key in estimating the 
size of the underground’s economy. To estimate, a useful toll is the data from Colombia’s 
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Minister of Defense (2000 Report). The National Anti-Narcotics Direction of Colombia 
concluded the following about cocaine activities: Coca growers pick up a harvest four 
times per year. Each harvest produces 1,350 Kg. of coca leaves per hectare, which 
produces 1.6 Kg. of coca base, and finally converts to 1.45 Kg. of pure cocaine. 
The production of cocaine depends on coca plantation hectares. In 1991 Peru 
produced 520 tons. of coca, Colombia produced  60 tons. and Bolivia produced  220 tons. 
This indicates that Colombia’s participation in production was only 8 percent. But in 
1999 Colombia reached 520 tons. of production, switching to  first place followed by 
Peru with 175 tons. and Bolivia with 70 tons. of coca.82  As a result of  the pure and 
quality of Colombia’s cocaine, one cocaine gram exported from Colombia through 
international traffickers represents four cocaine grams on the demand side. Thus, the 
profit for producers and traffickers is highest. For the Colombia’s producers one kg of 
cocaine is worth at home $1,600 US dollars. The price is expanding through the chain of 
traffickers. Then, one cocaine-Kg. in the U.S. markets range from $25,000 to  $30,000 


















Figure 17.   Cocaine Average Value (U.S. $ per kg.) 
From:  Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes, Diciembre 1999 
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The estimated cocaine potential production for the last five years was 2,447 tons. 
minus 627 tons. destroyed by aerial spraying, minus 217,1 tons. seized by government 
forces, and, finally, 1603 tons. was available for marketing. This means that the 
Colombian forces seized and destroyed 35 percent of potential cocaine production for 
markets. 
In the case of Colombia’s heroin, one-kilogram ranges from $10,000 to.$ 12,500 
US dollars at home. In the international market, its price reached $70,000 US dollars for 











Figure 18.   Heroin Average Value (U.S. $ per kg.) 
From: Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes, 09 Diciembre 1999 
In order to hamper production the government use to destroy 34,915 Kg. of 
heroin, and also Colombian forces seized 1,376 Kg. of heroin. These figures indicate that 
heroin production in the last five years is approximately 71,163 kg. In total official forces 
destroyed and seized 50 percent of potential heroin production.84 According to the  
National Anti-Narcotics Direction of Colombia, more than 80 percent of drug profit 
remains in the U.S. and Europe financial markets, and the remaining  20 percent returns 
to Colombia as contraband, weapons and dollars fueling the domestic drug operation.85 
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Figure 19.   Cocaine Profit Distribution 
From: Direccion Nacional de Estupefacientes de Colombia 
Research from “United Nations, Division of Drug Control, Crime Prevention, 
Money Laundry, and Financial Sanctuaries” (New York, 1999, p.106) claimed that 
money laundering from the drug business is estimated at $ 200 billion of US dollars per 
year.86 
For Roberto Steiner, two reasons are important to estimate the income of 
Colombians involved in the drug trade: (1) It is valuable information for Colombia’s 
economic authorities, and (2) It is important for multilateral anti-drug efforts.87 
Additionally, Steiner’s research discovered and analyzed these figures: 
It is thought that at least $7 billion per annum eventually returns to 
Colombia from drugs (Whynes, 1991, p.484), but this amount falls short 
of the one reported by MacDonald (1989) according to whom drugs could 
be Colombia’s biggest source of national income –nearly 36 per cent of its 
total gross national product. With a GDP in 1988 of around $50 billion, 
MacDonald is suggesting that Colombia receives $18 billion a year from 
drug export. Indeed, Andelman (1994, p.98) went even further, implicitly 
suggesting that yearly revenues for the Colombian cartels in the U.S.A. 
could reach $25 billion, i.e. 50 per cent of GDP. In none of the above 
estimates is there an explicit methodology; in most cases there is no 
mention of the reference period; and in several instances we have 
estimates based on other estimates.88  
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 In connection with drug trade, Steiner additionally offered his viewpoint: 
Colombia’s net total income from illicit drugs –i.e. including marijuana 
and heroin – could have been 7 percent of GDP and 70 per cent of exports 
at its peak during the first half of the 1980s. For the recent past it 
represented close to 3 per cent of the GDP and around 25 percent of legal 
exports. Even though these estimates give no support to the claim that the 
Colombian economy has been taken over by the drug trade, it is still the 
case that small group of outlaws is receiving yearly income to the tune of 
3 per cent of GDP. While yearly revenues from coffee also stand around 3 
per cent of GDP, they provided for the livelihood of 300,000 families. It 
seems fair to conclude that, while drugs do not seem to represent crucial 
element in Colombia’s economic well-being, they have implied a huge 
transfer of power to a small group of individuals involved in organized 
crime.89   
In giving his opinion, Thoumi’s focused on some facts that define Colombia’s 
underground economy:  
First, the underground economy is large and, while there are no accurate 
measures of its size, it has clearly grown faster than the formal economy 
since the mid-1970s. Second, the state’s ability to enforce its laws, and the 
respect and loyalty it commands are extremely weak, having decline 
through time. Third, most illegal economic activity in Colombia does not 
carry a social stigma, and in many cases has been institutionalized in a 
process in which the government itself has frequently participated, at least 
passively. Fourth, the country’s laws, regulations, and institutions made 
some assets, especially real estate, a good vehicle for hiding capital. Fifth, 
many economic transactions in Colombia [‘s] “dirty” money –that is, 
convert legally earned income capital into illegal and hidden forms. In 
short, many of these actions are simply the accepted way to do business 
and government policies have contributed to such an environment.90  
Other Colombian government actions have also contributed to economic law- 
breaking, from Thoumi’s perspective: (1) The black market exchange rate was below the 
official one for substantial periods of time, and the purchases were seen as part of the 
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exchange rate policy followed by the Colombian government. (2) Until 1991, it was 
illegal for Colombian residents to hold foreign exchange or other financial assets in or out 
side the country.  Thus, the restricted government policy led the businessmen to negotiate 
foreign exchange in the black markets, increase their profit for buying dollars below the 
official rate, circumvent taxes, elude accountable registers, and hide their assets from 
custom and internal revenue services oversight. 
Briefly, during the last twenty years, the growth of Colombia’s underground 
economy, from smuggling to drug trafficking, has been one of the most remarkable 
issues. Given its size, government policies accepted its importance and impact on the 
national economy.  For Thoumi, ascertaining to what degree the illegal drug industry-
generated capital has been invested in Colombia’s economy is not possible; even though 
real estate has been a favorite sector for industry investments. Another area of investment 
is in soccer teams, which provide money-laundering channels. For example, altering gate 
receipts can be used to launder dirty money, and the players’ salaries can be paid in 
under-the-table dollars.91  
In order to summarize the size of the drug economy, some data need to be 
considered: (1) Colombia’s National Association of Financial Institutions (ANIF) 
reported that worldwide street sales of Colombian cocaine, heroin and marijuana totaled 
$ 46 billion US dollars in 1999. Based on the assumption that less than 10 percent of total 
sales are repatriated to Colombia each year, ANIF estimated that the country’s total 
earnings from the illicit drug trade amounted to approximately $ 3.5 billion US dollars in 
1999. This figure placed drug earnings close to the $ 3.75 billion US dollars from oil--the 
country’s top export—and more than two and one half times earnings from coffee exports 
in 1999.92  (2) The estimate of contraband and other types of unregistered trade presents a 
much greater difficulty. As an illustration, the estimates for contraband vary between $ 
1.8 billion US dollars annually, as calculated by the Office of Taxes and National Custom 
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in 1992, and $ 5.5 billion US dollars, as calculated by the National Comptroller in 
1995.93 
D. THE NATIONAL COST OF THE DRUG INDUSTRY 
The drug industry has impacted several areas in Colombia. Drug trafficking 
involves political cost by weakened legal and judicial institutions with terrorism, 
intimidation, and corruption. However, economic, social and ecological costs are the 
most expensive due to the difficulty in quantifying the real damage and its future impact 
on the upcoming Colombian generations. 
The economic cost of the cocaine industry is measured in several ways: First, for 
the national budget allocated a quantity of money each year to conduct anti-narcotic 
operations. For instance, the budge has allocated in 1995 by Colombian government for 
enforcing the drug laws, and prosecuting drug kingpins was more than $990 million US 
dollars, or almost 2 per cent of the nation’s GDP.94   Second, the economic cost of 
security measures is preventing Colombian businesses from being involved in the narco-
traffickers’ web. Third, national manufacturing is suffering from imports made cheap 
with “dirty money”. Fourth, the property values are collapsing after the artificial coca-
financed boom, collapse that started in 1995. And fifth, the government is losing control 
over economic policy, because the vast size revenues of the cocaine industry reduce its 
ability to control the economy. 
On the other hand, if businesses are paying additional cost, they must take 
extraordinary precautions to protect their export containers from becoming instruments of 
drug smuggling. These businesses run the risk of a shipment being confiscated or at least 
delayed if drugs are found. Additionally, more money needs to be spent by private 
security firms to control export processing. For Colombia’s enterprises competing in the 
global market under these circumstances is hard.  
Nazih, in a research of Colombia’s political economy and violence, has pointed 
out the cost of private security measures: 
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 By 1997, the number of security companies has grown into a highly 
profitable sector in the business community. Today there are 
approximately 385 private security agencies, with 104 branches spread 
throughout 627 departments; there are 7 agencies that specialize in the 
protection of securities, with 49 branches. At last count, the total number 
of people employed by these agencies numbered 89,159 operatives, plus 
5,210 administrative personnel. It has been estimated that private groups 
(both businesses and individuals) spend about $150 million (0.3 percent of 
the GDP) to protect their properties and ensure their personal safety.95 
Clawson, Patrick and Lee offer this analysis: 
Colombia manufacturing has suffered because of imports made cheap by 
the overvalued exchange rate and by widespread smuggling, perhaps for 
sale at a loss, as [a] way to launder narco-dollars. Low cost contraband 
imports have seriously hurt the textile industry, the centerpiece of 
Medellin’s economy. A General Electric factory producing portable radios 
in Colombia in the 1980s, went out of business because its products could 
not compete with a flood of illegal imported radios.96 
In other words, neither large, medium nor small enterprises can easily survive in 
an unfair market environment, following government regulations and labor codes. The 
bankruptcy of small and medium Colombian enterprise is the real damage from narco-
dollars because money laundering through contraband impedes enterprises in competing 
in open markets. 
In reference to money laundry activities, Thoumi states:  
The Medellin cartel has shown preference for urban estate investments, 
and has purchased large tracks of land in rural areas of the country. The 
Cali and other small traffickers group have invested more in urban 
enterprises and, utilizing the widespread social tolerance for contraband 
imports, have apparently been the main source of what is sold in the “San 
Andresitos”, found in almost every Colombian city. The combination of 
the lack of long-term financing, a net worth tax, and a capital gains tax 
that was primarily a tax on inflation made real estate an ideal sector to 
hide drug-profits. By extension, real estate became the prime vehicle for 
money laundering and a favorite investment of illegal psychoactive drug 
entrepreneurs. Arango (1987) found that: for 45 percent of the illegal 
drugs entrepreneurs surveyed, urban and rural real estate was their first 
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investment choice, for 20 percent it was cattle raising, and for 10 percent 
construction. None of the entrepreneurs considered manufacturing as his 
first investment choice.’ Indeed, Sarmiento (1990) pointed out about the 
penetration of the money laundry in the Colombia’s economy and its 
repercussion: ‘clearly, if the illegal drugs industry were to disappear, 
Colombia would run a risk of having a recession for a couple of years.97 
In regards to the current recession, the crackdown on the Cali cartel hierarchy 
during 1995 has had negative economic repercussion, at least locally. Construction 
activity in Cali dropped 10.7 percent in the first four months of 1995, and retail sales 
declined 3.2 percent in the first semester of that year. Real estate dropped by one-third 
between January and November. Cali unemployment rate rose from 6.9 percent in 
December 1994 to 11.3 percent in June 1995 –an increase of 64 percent. For a long time, 
money laundering through construction activity was a labor factor that contributed to the 
basic needs of blue-collar workers. After the Cali cartel collapsed the government did not 
institute plans to help these poor workers. From 1995 until today, the workers’ labor 
condition remains unchanged.  
The cartel’s influence on the Colombian economy also spans  many activities:  
Cali enterprises span many economic sectors: banks, communications, 
construction, urban transport, light industry, agribusiness, and retailing.  
Some 30 to 40 percent of the building construction in Cali was financed 
by Cali drug money. The cartel maintains extensive real estate and 
business holding outside of Cali, for example, in or near the Pacific 
Coastal port of Buenaventura and on the island of San Andres (actually in 
total administrative bankruptcy). Cali traffickers own at least fifteen five-
start hotels, as well as several casinos and boat rentals in San Andres 
Island. In Buenaventura, they have invested in shipping and construction 
enterprise and have establishing [ed]  large supermarket chains. Cali cartel 
business compromise pharmaceutical companies, investment corporations, 
and dozens of interrelated businesses.98 
 
Undoubtedly, the narco-traffickers’ laundering activities drive up prices in ways 
that endanger legal investors. “Drug[s] has [have] funded a construction boom in Cali, 
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including shopping centers, hotels, and luxury apartment buildings. Urban property prices 
rose 50 to 60 percent a year from 1991 through 1994. The artificial coca-financed 
property boom was followed by a collapse in property values. Salomón Kalmanovitz, 
with the Colombian Central Bank Research claimed that such a collapse resulted from the 
Colombian government’s crackdown on the Cali cartel in early-mid 1995.” 99  This led to 
the high rate of unemployment in the Cauca Valley, and the paralysis of the related 
construction businesses in the region. Thus, after the collapse, the properties value was 
more realistic without the speculative narco-factor that allowed money laundering for a 
long time.   
In fact, most of the cocaine income has been of dubious benefit. Some of the 
money has been wasted in low-profit (or unprofitable) investments undertaken to hide the 
funds from the law. Traffickers imported goods legally and sold them at prices even 
lower than paid in the foreign markets.  
Clawson, Patrick and Lee’s research discovered that money laundering techniques 
in Colombia involved substantial international interchange: 
Cali organizations have converted cocaine cash to Russian commodities 
such as diamonds and non-ferrous metals that can be resold for “clean” 
hard currency in the West. In general, international narco-cooperation 
opens new markets for narcotics and other illegal products, exploits 
economies of scale in selling to those markets, finds new laundering 
outlets for illegal drug capital and diminishes criminal formations’ 
vulnerability to prosecution by national governments.100  
 
Further comments by Clawson, Patrick and Lee regarding the social cost of the 
cartel’s influence described the power “landlords” possess over displaced peasants in 
Colombia:  
The situation (of peasants) changed as Colombian cocaine barons invested 
some of their profits in vast tracts of land –reportedly at least 1 million 
hectares in the mid-to late 1980s in Cordoba, Antioquia, Meta, and other 
Colombia departments [states]. For example, in the Middle Magdalena 
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Valley town of Puerto Boyaca, which became the paramilitary movement 
in Colombia, drug trafficking purchases raised the price of a hectare of 
land from $100,000 in the early 1980s to $1 million in 1989. Many of the 
recently purchased tracts of land lay in ‘red zones’, where predatory 
guerrillas maintained a strong presence. 101 
Consequently, peasants abandoned their lands because they were targets between 
guerrillas and paramilitaries confrontation. In 1999 alone at least 225,000 people were 
driven from their homes, communities and livelihoods by political and drug-relate 
violence. The vast impoverished majority of displaced Colombians have found 
themselves condemned to roam the country as internal migrants in search of food, work, 
shelter and safety.102 This majority is in contrast to the privileged 1,072,449 Colombians 
that have managed to immigrate from 1996 to 2000 to the U.S., Venezuela and Ecuador. 
This period  (1996-2000) represents Colombia’s national crisis, triggered by skyrocketing 
kidnappings, guerrillas and para-militarism escalation, and coca and poppy crops 
expansionism. In the last period in comment, most of the wealthy people left the country 
with their financial capitals fueling unemployment, the real estate and land collapse, and 
the social security system faltered due to the lack of investment and economic 
contributions to the social system. Between 1985 and 2000, the country’s guerrilla and 
drug conflict displaced some 3.3 million Colombians from their places of origin (7.8 
percent of the total population). 103 
Another important impact due to drug operations is the socio-economic cost, 
deriving from the threat by the U.S. to decertify Colombia in 1995: 
The U.S. was dissatisfied with Colombia on a number of counts: its failure 
to capture major drug kingpins, the increase of money flows into 
Colombia in the 1990s, and allegation of drug-related corruption at high 
political levels (Samper’s administration). U.S. perceptions of the 
weakness of Colombia’s criminal justice system prompted Washington’s 
decision not to grant Colombia full certification in early 1995 for its 
counter-narcotics efforts. Full desertification would have exposed 
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Colombia to U.S. economic retaliation, including the loss of most foreign 
assistance and possible increase tariffs on Colombian products.104  
Samper’s administration feared U.S. retaliation through the certification process. 
For this reason,  all military and national police capability was directed at the search and 
capture of Cali-cartel traffickers. At the same time, the FARC, ELN and AUC increased 
their influence and power by taking opium poppy and coca-growth plantations under their 
control. These new actors imposed taxation, protection and control over small cocaine 
producers. As a result, small narco-traffickers were spreading across the country without 
notorious links between them (there have not been any up until today), making 
enforcement law more difficult. The drug production and its trafficking continue to 
contradict Colombia’s counter drugs efforts.  
The question now is why did the activity of the drug traffickers replacing the 
cartels not have a positive impact on the economy Nina M. Serafino from the 
Congressional Research Services gives her point of view on this question: 
For one, the large Medellin and Cali cartels have been replaced by smaller 
independent traffickers and splinters from the Cali cartel. As of mid-1998, 
the Colombian Police had counted some 43 independent trafficking 
groups, about half of them based in the Antioquia, of which Medellin is 
the capital, and the others in the northern Cauca Valley, around Cali. 
Several groups of independent cocaine traffickers from the northern Cauca 
Valley had expanded their activities through the sale of cheap high quality 
heroin. (Heroin became a significant export from Colombia after 1990, 
when substantial opium poppy cultivation in Colombia was first reported, 
and Colombia traffickers are now the largest suppliers of heroin to the 
eastern U.S.) The rise of independent traffickers has complicated efforts to 
reduce trafficking, according to some analysts. Because they adopt 
conservative lifestyles, and work in groups of 10 to 20, using small 
legitimate businesses as fronts, independent traffickers are hard to 
identify.105 
 
In sum, the economic cost to the Colombia’s economy from drug trafficking is 
described as follow:  
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(1) The illicit drug business has had a negative impact on the rest of the economy by 
driving the exchange rate lower. A type of Dutch disease, which some analysts 
call the Andean disease, has resulted. This phenomenon results in a loss of 
competitiveness of those sectors of the economy that produces goods for export or 
goods that substitute for imports, because of the tendency for the peso to be 
overvalued. 106  
(2)  Much drug-trafficker spending is on luxury goods that are generally imported 
without aggregated value to the other sectors of the economy. Drug traffickers 
have little interest in investing their money in the industrial sector; the overall 
result is limited economic growth.  
(3)  An immense proportion of the best lands in the country have landed in the hands 
of the drug traffickers. This process has translated into a general displacement of 
agricultural activity, both because the lands in question are now devoted to 
pasturages or recreational farms, or because, if they are dedicated to productive 
activities, technological improvements are introduced that result in bankrupting 
the competition. The high cost of land generated by the drug traffickers’ limitless 
demand has worsened the problems of poverty, unemployment, and productivity 
in the Colombian countryside.107  
(4)  The drug trafficking effects on national production are devastating, at least in 
terms of products with clearly distorted prices that in no way reflect the cost of 
production. In their operations, drug traffickers do not mind losing money on 
underinvoicing an import or selling a contraband product below is real value.108 
(5)  Drug trafficking has also negative affected the Colombian economy through its 
chilling effect on foreign investment; potential investors are put off by the 
violence associated with the drug trade. Such violence, coupled with the violence 
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engendered by the guerrillas, severely compromises the sense of security of 
foreign investors.109 
E. DAMAGE TO THE RULE OF LAW 
In Colombia, drugs are associated with the degradation of the judicial sector and 
with the increasing ineffectiveness of the court system in resolving civil disputes. Such 
judicial failures are eroding the morale of ordinary Colombians and are threatening the 
country’s future, altering the status quo of the society. “Cocaine traffickers have 
perverted Colombian politics, distorting public debate by using violence and money to 
silence opposition. The cocaine industry has undermined the rule of law, which is the 
foundation of a civilized society.”110  
The question is how the drug cartels undermined the rule of law? Clawson, 
Patrick and Lee have offered this explanation: 
In 1980s and early 1990s, leaders of Medellin and Cali cartels negotiated 
as a group with the Colombian government in an effort to obtain collective 
judicial benefits such as sentences reductions, and end to extradition, and 
even amnesty for their crimes. At the moment, there are differences 
related to the cartel’s political style and its impact in the rule of law that 
facilitate it: (a) Medellin traffickers used their vast fortunes to bankroll 
political movements and (in 1980s) to seek elective office directly; (b) 
Cali leaders have stayed out of politics, except for buying politicians or 
contributing to political campaigns; (c) The Medellin coalition unleashed 
violence against Colombia state institutions and against Colombia’s 
political elite, and also financed an armed crusade against the 
revolutionary left; (d) The Cali cartel does not generally use violence as a 
political tool.” 111 
In fact, “the Medellin drug cartel succeed [ed] in demolishing the U.S. Colombian 
extradition treaty; reportedly Escobar had spent vast sums on bribes to members of the 
1991 Constitutional Assembly to accomplish this objective.”112 The Colombian 
Constitution banned extraditing its citizens; however, in December 1997 after the US 
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pressured Samper’s Administration Colombia reinstalled extradition at the request of US. 
Since then, some Colombians have been extradited to the US. 
F. COLOMBIA’S WAR AGAINST DRUGS: ACTIONS AND RESULTS  
The U.S. through military assistance and funds supports Colombia’s war against 
drugs. The strategic theory of Plan Colombia links economic development and security to 
the peace process. The overall strategy to achieve this goal is by controlling funds for the 
narcos and negotiating with fighting actors out of law. 
Drug money feeds the coffers of the guerrillas, whose attacks give rise to 
the self-defense organizations (paramilitaries). If the money going to the 
narcos is taken away, the guerrillas cannot mount the attacks, they become 
less threatening, and the paramilitaries have less reason for being. The 
prospects for bringing the guerrillas and the paramilitaries to the table for 
serious peace negotiations are enhance because they have less justification 
and less ability to wage war against the state and against each other. Plan 
Colombia endeavors to strengthen the state, reenergize an economy with 
deep unemployment, generate the conditions necessary for the pursuit of 
peace, control the expansion of illegal crops and drug trafficking, and 
restore civil society. The Plan is a great strategy for the remarking of the 
nation into a secure democratic society freed of violence and 
corruption.113 
After three years of implementing Plan Colombia, supporters and detractors are 
questioning the Plan’s efficiency because cocaine production has continued to rise 
without any regard to violence escalation, economic crisis, internal migration and 
unemployment. Despite the widespread use of glyphosate and large scale-damage to the 
Colombian ecosystem—aerial spraying has not reduce the production of coca, which 
more than double between 1992 and 1998.114 Some tactical and operational facts are still 
controversial about the anti-narcotics agenda between the U.S. and the Colombian 
government, such as the aerial spraying of defoliants. 
Most certainly, the fear of losing “Plan Colombia” put Pastrana’s administration 
in conflict with Colombia’s southern peasants. Furthermore, Pastrana’s administration is 
under pressure of Non Government Organizations and international environmental 
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organizations, which resist aerial chemical fumigation and biological warfare for anti-
drug-operations. 
The environmentalists argue that “the practice of aerial spraying sets in motion a 
destructive cycle of chemical pollution, livelihood destruction, migration into more 
vulnerable areas, deforestation of the Amazon, displacement and expansion of the areas 
of illicit crop cultivation, which then are again fumigated.”115  
In the opinion of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), fumigation 
has failed to achieve its objectives. Fumigation campaigns targeting peasants growers 
actually work to the guerrilla’s advantage by further exacerbating social tension. In 
addition, a lack of regional development programs and the failure of the Colombian 
government to provide basis services have also worsened social tensions.116   
The contradiction between repressions without development has been the FARC’s 
motivation for violence escalation. The guerrillas are looking at coca-plantation as the 
defenders of small peasants farmers against government intimidator forces. 
Another policy has faltered. The expropriation of many assets associated with 
drug industry leaders failed, because the judicial system could not find a legal basis for 
many seizures. Properties titles given to other individuals, because the power and bribes 
of the accused kingpins. Nevertheless, as an illustration of the government’s effort, from 
1997 to 2001, Colombia’s Anti-Narcotics Agency through the General Prosecutor Office 
has confiscated 7,994 real estate properties, and 2,425 vehicles (between aircrafts, ships 
and trucks). Additionally through judicial actions, 347 enterprises and 103 commercial 
businesses has been confiscated and put on judicial trials. Most of these properties belong 
to drug-lords like Pablo Escobar, Helmer Herrera, and criminal organizations of Cali, 
Medellin, Leticia, Llanos Orientales, Northern Cauca Valley and the Atlantic Coast, 
which had been holding their properties through figurehead. 
From the regional perspective, the U.S. anti-drug offensive in Colombia has been 
adding tension along the borders, with reports of refugees crossing into Ecuador for 
                                                 
115http://www.tni.org/drugs/research/dpcol.htm. “Drugs and Peace in Colombia,” Program of the 
Transnational Institute and Action Andina. Jalsma, Martin and Vargas, Ricardo.   
116 http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol4/v4n30colo_body.html  “Colombia’s Role in 
International Drug Industry.” 
63 
safety. Ecuadorians are clamoring to the government to tighten security along a 375-mile 
(600-km) border that stretches from the Amazon jungle across the Andes mountain range 
to the Pacific Coast. Ecuadorians plead with the government to clamp down on 
migration, blaming the surge in violence on an agreement that allows Colombians to 
travel freely in Ecuador for up 90 days without a passport. 117 
The results of the “Colombian Plan” against drug production was summarized by 
Colombia’s President Pastrana, as follows:  
(1) The Colombian Plan has produced few victories because the conclusions are that 
drugs are still the first-or second-biggest business for mankind. 
(2) Pastrana urged president Bush to help organized an international narcotics 
conference in order to make an evaluation –and not only for the policies of 
fumigation and interdiction. 
(3) A global narcotics industry worth $500 billion exist today with drug-lords seeking 
out new markets in Europe, and the former Soviet Union. 
(4) Pastrana said that the U.S. and Europe should stem the laundering of drug money 
and control the export of chemicals used in Colombia to process cocaine. 
(5) He expressed that more can be done to crackdown on money laundering, pointing 
to growing demand in consuming countries and adding that European nations and 
Mexico (one of the major drug smuggling transit routes) should attend in drive to 
boost international anti-narcotics cooperation. 118  
In summary, this means that new white-collar trafficker organizations, with low 
profile, continue to run drug business operations in Colombia, keeping their properties 
out of the reach of the enforcement agencies. To prevent the detection and the tracking of 
their illicit activities traffickers are not using banking operations any more; instead of 
banking; they are keeping the drug profit in middle-income housing —using it as a bank.  
Recently, Colombia’s national police discovered and confiscated  $35 million US dollars 
in cash in two-upscale apartment in Bogotá, Colombia—possibly one of the largest 
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seizures ever of drug money. The confiscated money was packed in more than 300 
bundles of $100,000 each, in $20, $50 and $100 denominations.119  
In relationship with the government actions against the white-collar traffickers 
new generation, the Colombian government through its General Prosecutor is attacking 
the challenge that money laundry represents. The General Prosecutor has created a net of 
institutions to detect property and profit of these new white-collar traffickers. This net is 
integrated with the Colombian Stock Market, the Financial Bank Institutions, the 
National Superintendent of Banks, the National Direction of Custom and Taxes (DIAN 
Spanish acronym), the National Anti-Narcotics Agency, the Export and Commerce 
Institute (INCOMEX Spanish acronym), the Notary Offices and Real Estate Register, and 
with some advisor companies of financial institutions which store a financial database of 
customers (DANCOOP, DATACREDITO, COVINOC Spanish acronyms). Thus, in 
response, these criminal organizations are not making capital investments in Colombian 
enterprise to prevent their detection and capture. 
G. CONCLUSION 
After many historical efforts between the U.S. and Colombia to reduce the 
traditional drug-cartels influence and power, the FARC and the new white-collar 
traffickers are presently worsening the drug-war by conducting their business in a 
complex, bloody, and asymmetric fashion. The outcomes are: 
(1) Drugs through terrorism, corruption and threat have diminished the mobility of the 
civil society and its institutions to enforce the law.  
(2) The foreign exchange rate system has allowed the black market (casas de cambio de 
divisas) as well as the San Andresitos shopping centers to become key units for 
stimulating money-laundering, contraband and tax evasion.  
(3) The benefits for Colombia after 20 years of drug intimidation have been 
counterproductive. The underground economy generated a temporary economic 
boom in businesses without real capital investment value. Money laundering was the 
tactic used through the formal economy but with the alternative of siphoning-off 
funds when the law enforcement reacted. After cartels collapsed, drug-capitals flew 
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to other offshore fiscal paradises. The only things remain are: (a) Thousand of 
luxuries apartments and houses, storages, farms and other properties confiscated by 
Colombia’s Prosecutor, but with the added of burden high administrative costs for 
protection. (b) The atomization of small narco-traffickers that complicate anti-drugs 
operations, allowing them to raise their clandestine power with a low profile (c) The 
social-net damage cause by the lack of moral constraints after the development of a 
culture of rapid wealth by the use of intimidation, bribes, and violence. (d) The fear 
of the judges applying justice due to the intimidator capacity of drug-kingpins. (e) 
The increase of paramilitary groups, which are protect landlords involved in drug-
trafficking operations, causing internal migration and refugees. 
(4) On the other hand, the main constraint on the counter-narcotics policy is the 
traffickers’ ability to corrupt and intimidate the political system because drug-power 
undermines the rule of law. The solution of Colombia’s drug problem depends on 
transnational agreements, which must compromise all states sharing the same policy 
and goals. 
(5) Until the development of Colombia’s economy provides enough legal options to 
absorb the underemployed who are now streaming out of the highlands and into the 
cities, crops substitutions could just be farmers rotating –some leave coca, others 
enter. A similar problem exists with the aerial chemicals being sprayed for 
eradication, which are causing more forest devastation. If the defoliants destroys one 
hectare, then the peasants will open a new one in the depth of the forest. 
Undoubtedly, the Bolivian crisis of 1985 and the Colombian crisis of 1998-2000 
have a similarity in how this crisis fueled coca production. Clawson, Patrick and Lee 
look at the Bolivian crisis:  
An explanation would be that the Bolivian cocaine boom was caused in 
part by the crisis in the legal economies. That is, because of the crisis, 
thousands were through out of work (as when the Bolivian government 
dismissed 30,000 miners in 1985) and thousands of young men looking for 
their first job were unable to find any productive employment. So, the 
jobless moved to the coca-growing regions, where land was readily 
available. Their labor made possible an expansion in coca production.120 
                                                 
120 Clawson, Patrick and Lee III, Rensselaer, “The Andean Cocaine Industry,” p. xi, 1996, St. 
Martin’s Press, New York. 
66 
In sum, the intimidating power of the drug industry has prevented Colombia from 
negotiating lasting peace, neither allowing the country to be in the globalization track, 
nor building a participatory democracy. Socio-economic improvements remain without 






















































































V. IS THE 1991 CONSTITUTION A REAL FACTOR 
CONTRIBUTING TO COLOMBIA’S ECONOMIC CRISIS? 
Many problems that Colombia faces today are a product of its new institutions 
and outcomes following the implementing of the 1991 Constitution.  This instrument 
envisions ruling a peaceful country through a participative and pluralistic democracy, 
fiscal decentralization, an egalitarian society with a total social security coverage, open 
markets and a neoliberal economic policy. After 10 years, some achievements of 
institutions created by the 1991 Constitution are being seriously questioned, such as the 
judicial system, where the rule of the law fails to be enforced, and the conflictive 
decentralization process at the municipal level, where rampant corruption and fiscal 
unbalance affect regional development. Undoubtably, the weak state institutions, and 
civil society with its difficulties of pursuing its national goals are the key barriers that 
have contributed to the economy’s recession, especially in the last half of the 1990s. 
Therefore, the 1991 Constitution is the third variable indirectly contributing to the present 
recession.  
This chapter argues that; (1) after the enactment of the 1991 Constitution 
Colombia faces more complex domestic problems due to the exclusionary process carried 
out in the design of the new constitution, where the traditional elite parties and their 
clientelistic machinery were excluded as well as the subversive actors (FARC-ELN-
AUC);  (2) the checks and balances of the institutions created by the 1991 Constitution 
are not the best due to many institutional weakness: the judicial system, the exchange 
regimen system, the fiscal decentralization and tax reforms failed,  therefore, affecting 
national economic stability, and foreign and domestic investment confidence; (3) the 
judicial system needs to be protected, and the independence of the Central bank and its 
oversight responsibility over the banking system is necessary to prevent corruption and 
siphoning off of state funds by political manipulations. The implementation of a fair 
fiscal decentralization process preventing subversive inherence and corruption, at 
municipal level, is also necessary. 
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 A. THE PROCESS OF ENACTING THE CONSTITUTION 
Colombia’s history shows that after bloody civil wars, political riots, peace 
negotiations with guerrillas and agreements between liberal and conservative political 
parties, the constitution has been changed six times. Most of the constitutional changes 
were made to ease the reincorporation of guerrillas to civilian life. Other changes 
addressed not only the possibility of citizens being present in Congress with their 
initiatives for reform, but also the possibility of referendums to approve constitutional 
reforms. However, after many political proposals and intentions Colombia’s socio-
economic situation, has not change much. 
The political constitution of 1991 was writted by the Asamblea Nacional 
Constituyente (National Constitutional Assembly). The Assembly was integrated by:    
(1) the Democratic Alliance M-19, which appeared in March of 1990 after the 
reincorporation of the M-19 guerrilla movement to civilian life; (2) the independent 
political movement “Movement of National Salvation” (a dissident faction of the 
traditional Conservative Party, which was trying to attract dissident right sectors from 
Liberal and Conservative parties); (3) the “Popular Liberation Army” (EPL) and the 
“Revolutionary Workers’ Party” (PRT) guerrilla groups that were concluding a 
negotiation and reincorporation process with the Gaviria’s administration; and (4) ethnic 
and religious minorities, such as the indigenous people, the Christians, and the Afro-
Colombian Communities.  
In contrast, the powerful subversive movements, FARC, ELN and AUC, were 
absent from this historical constitutional change, as well as the “traditional political elite” 
of the liberal and conservative parties whose clientelist machinery was not present.  In 
fact, the National Constitutional Assembly’s wanted to conduct the reform of the rules of 
the political game without the parties because the traditional political class was 
considered visibly corrupted, anti-reforming and self-serving—today Colombians are 
paying today the cost of this exclusionary decision. Ana Maria Bejarano explains the 
reason for this: 
The politicians (elite) have taken their revenge by recovering their control 
of the Congress, blocking the implementation of the Constitution of 1991, 
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or regulating it in a spirit openly contrary to that which was intended. 
Since 1991, political competition in Colombia has been view as 
‘progressive politicians versus traditional politicians’ the first understood 
as being proponents of the constitution of 1991, the second as their 
enemies, carriers of the worst vices of the Colombian political class. In 
such a polarized environment, it is difficult to coordinate within Congress 
itself the necessary actions for the legal instrumentation of the 
Constitution.121 
 
This means that the weak legislation of the Colombian Congress is not a matter of 
the debate of ideas, it is a matter of the retaliation between movements and fragmented 
traditional parties, which considered themselves enemies. This affected coalitions, 
alliances, transactions and, finally, the well being of the citizens. Constitutional projects 
like the reform of the Social Security System and Pensions, the Regional Development 
and Administrative Decentralization, the Peace Process among the violent actors. These 
actors, FARC, the ELN and the AUC, as well as the creation of a true ‘civil service’--the 
best antidote against clientelization of state--are difficult to reach under such 
circumstances. In fact, Bejarano has pointed out that the atomization of Colombia’s 
political forces influenced the writing of the 1991 Constitution because it was finally no 
more than a “patchwork” of articles unconnected and contradictory. In Bejarano words 
The fragmentation, weakness, and volatility of the many forces that 
participated in the fashioning of the Constitution limited the ability of 
these forces, such as the Democratic Alliance M-19 and the Movement of 
National Salvation, disappeared from the political scene shortly thereafter. 
One observer has reasonably commented that the Constitution of 1991 
does not have ‘mourners’.  That is to say, it lacks the backing of political 
forces, which, going beyond the formal process of putting the Constitution 
into effect, actually incorporated it into real political life, converting the 
written text into a living, functioning guide for the practices of politicians, 
public officials, and citizens.122 
The next step is to determine at what level the 1991 Constitution produced the 
desired effects and at what level it generated unanticipated consequences?  
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B. THE CHECKS AND BALANCES OF THE 1991 CONSTITUTION 
It is important to consider some positive effects of the 1991 Constitution such as 
its relative success in improving the role and power of the judiciary by  creating  new 
institutions (without regards of the impunity levels achieved until today). For instance, 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the “Accion de 
Tutela”-- have the capacity to protect the fundamental rights of citizens, when citizens 
believe public officials have violated their rights--and the Constitutional Court, which 
rules on the constitutionality of actions taken by the legislative and executive branches, 
making for a more balanced relationship among the powers.123  
Expectedly, decentralization constitutes one of the most important but poorly 
implemented successes reached by the 1991 Constitution. The distribution of resources 
and the decentralized taxing authority has had a negative effect on the finances of the 
central government. The government receives numerous critiques due to excessive 
corruption and inefficient expenditures at the municipal level. The other factor that 
contradicts the intention of the municipal fiscal decentralization is the noxious influence 
of the guerrillas and paramilitaries groups over the mayors’ outcomes. The subversives 
through extortion and intimidation influence the municipal expenditures looking for 
political benefits. 
Eliminating many restrictions inherited from the National Front that inhibited 
open competition among diverse political forces and that guaranteed the monopoly of the 
Liberal and Conservative parties was considered another relative success of the 1991 
Constitution. Moreover, the greatest innovation in the political control was that Congress 
could exercise over the executive, contained in the power to censure cabinet ministers. 
Additionally, Congress recovered certain budgetary powers, as well as powers to 
intervene in decisions made by the executive during periods of national emergency. 
Nevertheless, in the viewpoint of Bejarano, the achievements of the Colombian 
Congress after the enactment of the 1991 Constitution lack strength and autonomy to 
legislate because factors such as corruption, clientelism and the enormous fragmentation 
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of the parties inhibit the ability of Congress to control the executive. Bejarano has 
pointed out the negative effects of implementing the 1991 Constitution resulting in the 
atomizing political life in Colombia, with these comments: 
The impact of these reforms on party organizations and the party system 
has been contradictory, inefficient, and ineffective. The traditional parties 
not only have resisted the change, but they have also rapidly 
accommodated themselves to the new institutional situation without 
modernizing, democratizing, or strengthening themselves. On the 
contrary, in this process of accommodation, they have intensified their 
historical tendencies toward pragmatism, fragmentation, and clientelism. 
...Finally, it is necessary to note the resounding failure of the creation and 
consolidation of a political opposition in Colombia. This has occurred 
despite constitutional recognition of the legitimacy of political opposition 
and the inclusion of a series of rights that should guarantee its 
operation.124 
The 1991 Constitution was designed for citizens’ participation that permits 
vigilance over public affairs at different administrative levels.  However, Colombia’s 
civil society is practically non-existent. Colombian society is a multi-ethnic mass (whites, 
afro-Colombians, Indians, mestizos, llaneros, peasants) with different cultural profiles 
and personal interests that do not match with each other. The lack of citizens’ 
participation, as a democratic oversight, reflects the gap between the text and reality... “It 
is worth remembering that citizenship, participation, and representation do not only 
depend on the ‘effectiveness of a complex web of legal relationship’ but also on ‘state 
organizations willing and able rights affirmed in pertinent laws effective.”125  
Overall, in Bejarano’s view there are three vulnerabilities in the Colombian state 
that impede the implementation of its Constitution: (1) The way the civil services operate 
has not been modified and, as a result, corruption, clientelism, and all manner of 
particularism practices that contradict the democratic character of the reforms are 
perpetuated; (2) The state continues to demonstrate that it is incapable of providing basic 
public goods: defense, security, and justice. For this reason, peace continues to be an 
elusive proposition, and the armed actors who often violate the fundamental rights of 
ht of life, continue to exist; and (3) Colombia is not a state Colombians, especially the rig                                                 
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capable of supporting and enforcing constitutional norms. The efforts to democratize the 
state were not simultaneously accompanied by parallel efforts to strengthen it. For 
example, the administrative-bureaucratic apparatus and the armed forces were not 
touched by the Constituent Assembly (whether for good or bad reasons is not known.)126   
 
According to Alberto Alesina, the need for institutional reforms in Colombia is 
quite self-evident:  
Violence, crime and terrorism are rampant; the “social contract” is 
threatened. The Judicial system is incapable of effectively persecuting 
crime, while at the same time the Constitutional Court is too “pro-active” 
in economic areas better left to the market or policymakers. The 
parliament is fragmented, subject to a myriad of lobbying pressures and its 
relationship with the government is strained. The traditional 
macroeconomic stability of Colombia is threatened by institutional 
shortcomings. In fact, the process of decentralization has led to large fiscal 
imbalance and inefficiencies in the central/local government relationship. 
The budget process is chaotic and non-transparent. Improvements in the 
development of social services and poverty reduction programs are still 
lacking because of an inefficient use of limited resources. Monetary and 
financial stability require a firmer commitment to inflation control.127 
The judicial system is considered the great weakness of the 1991 Constitution due 
to Colombia’s crime situation; Colombia suffers a level of violence that is among the 
highest in the world. Clearly corruption and intimidation on the part of armed groups and 
drug cartels currently interferes with effective enforcement of law. In fact, the 
“Fiscales”—powerful prosecutors—are in control of justice files, which involve 
preparation for bringing a case to trial. Therefore, the primary bottleneck in achieving 
more convictions does not appear to lie with the judiciary, but rather with the fiscalia 
bringing only a limited number of cases. The table 5 shows a huge and growing backlog 
of unsolved cases emerged. The introduction of the “investigative judges” 
institutionalized the policy that persists to this day: hopelessly overloaded, the criminal 
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justice system focuses its meager resources on crimes that are easily solved, even if such 
crimes are minor and murderers and kidnapers go free. 128 
 





Crime 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0           100.0 100.0 
Reports 14.9 7.4 96.8 27.7              21.7 76.5 
Investigation 9.9 3.3 37.9 24.3 8.6 68.8 
Trials 2.8 1.0 11.2 17.2 2.5 49.8 
Sentences 1.7 0.6 6.8 10.4 1.5 30.2 
Table 4.   Judiciary Performance 1995 
From: Policia Nacional, DANE:ENH and Estadísticas de Justicia. 
 
C. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
In Alesina’s analysis, the formidable barrier that impeded even relatively small 
changes in economic institutions or even economic policy is the 1991 Constitution 
because it is very detailed in its prescription, and it almost demands the maximum 
amount of legislative transactional cost.  
According to Alesina’s research team, some institutional aspects of economic 
policymaking that affected Colombia’s economy are the decentralization and fiscal 
federalism, the budget institutions, the bureaucracy, the civil servant and teachers, the 
provision of social services and, finally, the Central Bank. With regards to 
decentralization and fiscal federalism, in the opinion of Alesina, Carrasquilla and 
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Echavarria, (economic research team of FEDESARROLLO) Colombia has become the 
most decentralized Latin America country, among the federal ones (i.e., Argentina and 
Brazil); even though, the process of decentralization had started earlier, the 1991 
Constitution has vastly accelerated the process.  However, there are some difficulties that 
impeded Colombia in improving socio-economic conditions in its regions, for example: 
“Tax collection remains vastly centralized, but spending is decentralized. This 
arrangement creates risk of fiscal imbalance, since the level of government that spends, 
does not fully internalize the cost of it’s spending. An additional problem stems from the 
fact that localities can borrow from banks, thus creating dangerous links between fiscal 
imbalance and financial stability of the banking system.”129 
In this case, some Colombian municipalities (i.e., Choco, San Andres and 
Providence, Cauca, Tolima) are registering serious fiscal imbalance--close to bankruptcy-
- because neither enforcing fiscal responsibility nor real oversight have been established 
by local authorities. Imposing the efficient use of resources for localities is the only way 
to prevent bankruptcies such as in comment. Not to mention the negative results for 
allowing mayors to borrow from the public by issuing bonds, or from private or public 
financial institutions, domestic or foreign. Mayors that acquire financial compromises for 
large investment projects  requiring multi-year financing leave office without assuming 
future responsibilities for the borrowed money. 
In sum, as Alesina, Carrasquilla and Echavarria have pointed out, the 
decentralization systems fail to impose tight budget constraints at the regional level and 
are prone to create fiscal imbalances, transmitted to the central government.  
The fiscal stability of Colombia was jeopardized soon after the 1991 
Constitutional issue, largely as the result of problems with the 
decentralization process. Furthermore, given the rigidity of the rules about 
the allocation of government spending at the local level, it is not clear to 
what extent the fiscal decentralization of 1991 has reached the goal of 
tailoring spending to local needs and improving efficiency in the delivery 
of social services... the excessive imbalance of social spending on health 
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and education has interfered with an efficient use of resources to reduce 
poverty.130  
 
In Alesina’s team research, while the share of Central Government expenditure in 
GDP has increased by 9 percentage points, the share of revenue has increased by only 4. 
Consequently in terms of GDP, the stock of debt has doubled and interest payment have 





 Revenue Expenditure Surplus Total 
Debt 
Interest
1990 10.3 9.7 -0.8 14.9 1.1 
1991 10.4 10.6 -0.2 12.9 1.2 
1992 10.8 12.5 -1.7 13.6 1.0 
1993 11.6 12.3 -0.7 13.45 1.1 
1994 11.4 12.8 -1.4 12.0 1.2 
1995 11.3 13.6 -2.3 13.2 1.2 
1996 12.0 15.7 -3.7 13.9 1.9 
1997 12.6 16.3 -3.7 17.5 2.0 
1998 11.9 16.8 -4.9 21.6 2.9 
1999 13.4 19.3 -5.9 29.6 3.3 
Table 5.   Colombia: Central Government Finances (GDP ratios) 
From: Departamento Nacional de Planeacion de Colombia 
    
Moreover, in the concept of Acosta and Borjas (a research economic team of 
FEDESARROLLO),  several problems have affected  Colombia’s public spending in 
education as a consequence of the new rules imposed by the 1991 Constitution. The 
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reorganization of the education system was developed in the context of a general 
decentralization of public administration. However, there has been confusion as to which 
level of government is best suited to administer the public education system. The overlap 
of responsibilities are generating confusion because there are teachers funded by 
municipalities (law 60 of 1993), by the central government (law 115 of 1994), and by 
both institutions because the Constitution emphasizes the role of the department level 
through the transfer of central funds.   
The other problem is that Colombia’s teachers (there are about 310,000 teachers 
equal to 26 percent of the total number of public employees), thanks to a very powerful 
union, are an overly protected category that, by and large, receives a very favorable 
treatment both in terms of salaries and, especially, in terms of pensions. These privileges 
including:  (a) public teachers do not have to contribute to the funding of the system in 
order to receive a pension;  (b) teachers qualify to receive a special pension at 50 year of 
age; (c) the pension is based on the average basic monthly salary of the last year 
employed at the time of retirement, including bonuses and other benefits; (d) the pension 
regime grants teacher the right to receive several of these pensions simultaneously; (e) 
teacher salaries are set by the Central government, with little input from municipal and 
departmental level, which end up paying the bill; (f) the inefficient appointment process 
allows the department and municipalities to create temporary teaching positions (by law 
of 1979), putting additional pressure on the Central government to increase its monetary 
transfers (opened more the fiscal deficit).131 
Consequently, in Alesina’s research team holds this point of view: 
 
 With unchanged legislation, public finances appear in even worse shape 
in the long run, given the expected evolution of the social security system 
and of the projected public intervention in the financial sector because the 
pension system is currently very distorted; it is very generous for a small 
fraction of the labor force, especially public employees. Furthermore, the 
tax code has been changed very frequently—nine tax law reforms in the 
last six years--, seriously compromising the stability of the system and, 
thus the incentive to invest. Many observers agree that a permanent 
resolution of the increasing problem of fiscal imbalance in Colombia 
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requires a revision of the arrangement concerning the relationship between 
Central Government and the local Governments. In fact, an increasing 
share of central Government outlays is in the form of transfers to the 
departments and municipalities, as mandated by the 1991 Constitution. In 
1999, for instance, transfers to the regions amounted to over 27 percent of 
total central government expenditures.132 
 
Several factors greatly contribute to the lack of transparency in fiscal policy, for 
Ayala and Perotti these are (1) not even the entire amount of national public pensions is 
covered in the budget (Territorial Entities and the rest of the Non-Financial Public sector 
are excluded); (2) the frequent use of non-standard accounting practices where the 
national deficit is hidden. Therefore, without a long and detailed analysis of both the 
revenue and spending sides of the budget it is an idea of the deficit impossible. In 
addition, without that, it is difficult to conceive the budget; and (3) the proliferation of the 
budget’s documents (the National Plan of Development, the National Plan of 
Investments, the Financial Plan, the Annual Operative Plan of Investments, and so on) 
many of these with multi-year horizon, reveals that the requirement of consistency can 
easily lead to mistakes. In addition, even though the Colombian Constitution attributes a 
strong role to the Finance Minister in the preparation of the budget, the multiplication of 
documents and agencies involved tends to obfuscate and reduce his role. 133  
Ayala and Perotti point out the following in regards to the budget institutions: 
The public should have a clear and transparent view of the fiscal policy 
run by the government. In Colombia instead, the preparation, discussion 
and implementation of the budgets is not transparent. As a result, the 
average citizens, journalist and even trained economist would have a hard 
time understanding the Colombian budget documents. In recent years, 
international organizations have put a lot of emphasis on improving 
transparency.134  

                                                 
132 Alesina Alberto, Carrasquilla Alberto and Steiner Roberto, “Decentralization in Colombia” p. 05, 
FEDESARROLLO, Working Papers Series, Agosto 2000, No.15 
 
133 Ibíd., p.16, 17. 
134 Ayala, Ulpiano and Perotti, Roberto, “Budget Institutions in Colombia”, FEDESARROLLO, 
Working Papers Series, November 2000, No. 21 
79 
On the other hand, the labor rules established in the Constitution of 1991 created 
many new economic responsibilities at the enterprise level. This meant that businesses 
were forced to pay for many additional benefit programs for workers.  The economic 
overload for enterprises is represented in “retirement pensions” and its interest rate, and 
in “fire-workers compensation”(the enterprises must put on reserve one monthly-payment 
for each year-worked, with the banking interest rate, when dismissing any employed).  
The labor rules also demand the   constitution of “labor-risk insurance and health,” a 
monthly economic contribution for “Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar” 
(“Family Welfare Institution”), a monthly economic contribution for the “Servicio 
Nacional de Aprendizaje (“National Services of Technical Skills School”), a monthly 
economic contribution for “Cajas de Compensacion Familiar ” (“Moral and Welfare 
Institutions”), and finally a vacation wage-compensation for each year worked.  All of 
these worker benefit programs result in each enterprise spending an and additional U.S. 
56 cents for each  $1.00 U.S. dollar paid to any worker for doing any job. The economic 
overload that the enterprises must assume destroys incentive for capital investment or 
business expansion. The impact is measured in the high unemployment rate due to ‘the 
cost of opportunity lost’ for putting U.S. 56 cents for each dollar out of capital investment 
or out of production line. Labor rules like these make Colombian enterprises less 
competitive in confronting the challenge of globalization. 
 
D. THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIMEN  
Alesina, Carrasquilla and Steiner’s research has found that the 1991 Constitution 
was particularly concerned about keeping the government involved in the choice of 
exchange rate regimes. However, for a small open economy like Colombia the exchange 
rate is a tool that cannot be detached from an inflation control policy package. The 
unclear status of the Central Bank stemming from the 1991 Constitution, showed its 
consequences in a couple of occasions. In 1997 an over exposition of monetary policy in 
response to a downturn in 1996 contributed to monetary and financial turbulence in the 
ensuing year. In early 1997, the Samper government had the opportunity of appointing 
three new members of the board, all of them recruited within the ranks of the 
government. Recent intervention in the banking sector has lea to a Government/Central 
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Bank coordinated effort to bail out banks which seem to have gone beyond a temporary 
provision of liquidity.135  
By 1998, as a result of not having a political oversight interest and clear policy 
about who is responsible for supervising the financial sector, many state banks collapsed, 
such as the “Banco Central Hipotecario”, the “Banco Caja Agraria”, the  “Banco del 
Estado”, and some “Cooperative Banks of Workers”, where blue-collared workers put 
their savings. Illustrating the depths of the corruption in the bank sector, a February 2000 
report of the so-called “Truth Commission” on corruption in the state-banking sector 
revealed that over 7.2 billion pesos had been systematically siphoned off from six 
different state-owned banks. As a result of this huge financial scandal, more than 1,200 
criminal proceedings against bankers, congressmen, former ministers, labor leaders, 
businessmen, and high-level bureaucrats have recently been launched. In the words of 
Colombia’s Attorney General, such public/private sector corruption... “is even more 
dangerous (for the country) than the armed groups operating outside the law”. In fact, 
according to Transparency International, in 1999 Colombia ranked as one of the most 
corrupt countries on the planet.136  
The Alesina’s team recommendation is to fortify the Central Bank to take charge 
of  supervising  the financial system; this proposal for reform has the goal of subtracting 
this control from the Treasury given the possible conflict of interest between the goal of 
financial solidity and that of financial government spending (many times targeted by 
political manipulations).137 In Alesina’s team conclusion is, the 1991 reform of 
Colombia’s central bank law has produced less than satisfactory institutional 
arrangements. The reform intended to insure independence of the monetary authority in 
the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policy. That goal has not been completely 
achieved. The teams recommendations are (1) the central bank should be in charge of the 
role of controller of the financial and banking sector through supervision and regulation; 
(2) the central bank should be in charge of exchange rate policy because Colombia is an 
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small open economy and the exchange rate is a critical variable linked to inflation and 
monetary policy; (3) the definition of goals of monetary policy must be a balance 
between the goal of democratic control over monetary policy and that of policy 
independence; (4) the executive should not be allowed to nominate anyone who currently 
holds an executive position in the Central bank, so the Congress must do it. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The intention of the 1991 Constitution was to end the old model of political 
behavior,  but soon after the National Assembly drafted the new Constitution, 
parliamentary elections took place,  and the results strengthened traditional political class 
again, unfortunately this elites are the only capable of effective mobilization through 
clientelist and political manipulation. Without a doubt, the fragmentation of parties opens 
the door for individual dealings, secret pacts, shady deals and business negotiations.  
There is a need to re-establish governability in areas of the country controlled by 
criminal influence in order to guarantee the future success of the fiscal decentralization 
process. Due to the popular election of mayors, drug money allows guerrillas forces to 
make significant territorial gains; this has led in turn to a greater division of interest 
among guerrillas, narco traffickers and paramilitaries. The building up scenario of the 
1991 Constitution has therefore been interpreted as an armistice with the narco traffickers 
because it did not allow extradition, while the guerrillas and paramilitaries found it to be 
a tool for escalating and challenging the Colombian state. 
The judicial system continues to be weak showing high levels of impunity due to 
widespread intimidation and corruption by narco traffickers and terrorist organizations 
undermining the basement of Colombian institutions. Establishing the rule of law is the 
bottom line for overcoming Colombia’s economic crisis. 
The central bank needs to exercise  independent oversight in the financial sector 
to fit the new framework, with an independent monetary board not easily influenced by  
political manipulation. To guarantee that Colombian economy changes from a closed, 
provincial system, to one capable of competing in oversea markets, it is important to 
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allow changes in the financial sector and reform in the public sector to increase 
productivity and confidence in the economic programs. 
Finally, the weakness of the 1991 Constitution can be summarized in these words: 
The result of the 1991 Constitution was an enormously long document that 
attempted to reassure all sides that the future would be to their linking by 
introducing article after article with explicit provisions for all, followed by 
a general disclaimer of possible inapplicability in extenuating 
circumstances. The Constitution attempts   to be a document of rigid 
micromanagement (such indexation of pensions, setting targets for 
inflation and the allocation of regional public expenditures) rather than 
one that establishes basic institutions for democratic decision-making in a 
dynamic world. Moreover, written at the time when many nations in the 
world were emerging from state socialism and moving to market 
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After analyzing these three interrelated independent variables (subversive 
terrorism, drugs, and 1991 Constitution), this thesis concludes that the accumulated 
terrorism and violence generated by the Army Revolutionary Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Self-Defense Organization 
(AUC)—called paramilitaries—are the heaviest factors that contributed to Colombia’s 
economic recession in 1999.  This recession is considered the most critical event in the 
twenty-century in Colombian history.  
The thesis determined that the lack of domestic and foreign economic incentives 
for investment are due to terrorism and violence, which continue spreading its ruin over 
national territory. In this case, terrorism is fueling unemployment, economic uncertainty, 
and the loss of confidence for new businesses or for starting joint ventures, especially in 
the agricultural, cattle, and mining sector. These sectors are important for peasantry 
stability and  preventing  migration to the metropolitan areas where urban violence is 
rising.  
With regards to the oil and mining sector, Empresa Colombiana de Petroleos 
Nacionales (ECOPETROL) and its joint ventures with the British Petroleum Company 
(BP), and Occidental Oil Company negatively impacted the economy due to the thousand 
of compound criminal attacks against its infrastructure. The lost of profit derived from 
these attacks also affect domestic investment, especially in those areas where exploration 
and operation are functioning; in fact, the Colombian government is losing its 
opportunity to make investments in other sectors of the national economy to incentize 
employment, and development, and to improve conditions for its weak social security 
system, specially in health and education. 
The Colombian history shows that Samper’s Administration was unwilling to 
confront the subversive organizations with enough political and military power. Thus, the 
intense use of violence and corruption has accumulated finally impacting Colombia’s 
socio-economic well-being fueling the economic crisis until it reach a negative (-4.5) 
percent of GDP in 1999, never seen before in the national’s economic history. 
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Furthermore, some Colombian experts estimate that the conflict cost the country from 4 
percent to 9 percent of growth per year.139 
Drug trafficking, the second heavy factor feeding terrorist violence, continues 
spreading its criminal power through its atomization in small white-collar organizations, 
complicating law enforcement’s ability to track and detect its operations due its low 
profile. In addition, the drug-profit that continues returning to Colombia (it is no more 
than 20 percent of the total foreign drug-markets earnings) has a high probability of being 
converted in weapons, ammunitions and logistic supplies for the terrorist actors. Thus, 
the aggregate value for Colombia’s economy sector is minimal. Money-laundering in the 
informal sector continues feeding smugglers and contraband businesses, worsening the 
economic situation of medium and small Colombia’s enterprises due to unfair market 
competition, and causing unemployment and social unrest. 
The 1991 Constitution, the third factor in order, has indirectly contributed to the 
economic recession due to the lack of power to guarantee connivance, justice, peace, 
development and economic growth. The institutions developed after the 1991 
Constitution continue functioning with the same clientelistic political behavior where 
patronage and rent-seeking are the bottom line. The corruption survives because no ex-
ante oversight was established. In fact, “the civil society”, who was willing to do that,  
does  not exist in real terms. Moreover, the terrorist escalation has impeded the fiscal and 
municipal decentralization process with its power of intimidation and manipulation over 
almost 600 municipalities and the decisions by the majors’ outcomes. Additionally, the 
social security system continues to run with a   serious fiscal inbalance. The system could 
collapse due to the lack of political consensus among labor unions, congressmen, and 
enterprise owners.  
Moreover, these three factors are not isolated from the international economic 
crisis as a product of the globalization. The inbalance accumulated for several years 
before 1999 pushed Colombia’s economy for drastic adjustment. Next, the private sector 
caused a backslash in their economic activity, and balanced their external debt (valued 4 
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percent of the GDP). In order to get an adjustment, in the government sector, through 
agreements with the International Monetary Funds (IMF),  the Colombian government set 
economic policy goals to be reach between 2000 and 2002. The agreement with the IMF 
compromises (1) fiscal deficit reduction; (2) inflation rate reduction; (3) financial sector 
recovery, and (4) structural reforms to guarantee the financial viability of the public 
sector. 
A. COST OF VIOLENCE  
It is not easy to quantify the cost of violence and terrorism for Colombia, and 
especially, the indirect cost. Between 1990 and 1998 the gross direct cost of violence 
reached $3.2 billion US dollars a year, meaning 4.5 percent of the GDP. Perhaps, this 
estimate does not consider facts, such as the loss of confidence in the judicial system, the 
loss of the monopoly in the legitimate use of force by the state, the loss of the well-being 
for the population, and the opportunity and business transaction cost for the society. In 
other words, the real cost of terrorism and violence are underestimated due to difficulties 
in calculating the cost. 140 
In regards to opportunity cost lost, if this 4.5 percent of the GDP is oriented in 
population needs, it will be possible to accomplish the following: (1) in one year to give 
educational coverage to 1,118,000 elementary students under 10 years of age out off the 
educational system today; (2) in three year to solve the national housing deficit; or (3) in 
only two years to reach the goal of exploration, development and oil production needed 
for the next four years.141   
 One of the most difficult issues in estimating the real cost of violence and 
terrorism is the inability to understand the progressive weakness of government 
institutions, and the loss of the state’s reaction capacity, which is finally leads to into 
guerrillas and paramilitarism escalation as in the Colombian case. From 1994 until today, 
due to the weaken Colombian government institutions, the terrorist actors have  
strengthened their economic system to maintain and improve their military apparatus 
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through drug trafficking, systematic extortion and kidnappings. These activities represent, 
for terrorist organizations, 90 percent of their income and, explain the permanent conflict 
among these organizations in taking regional control over those areas where coca and 
poppy crops are growing. The increase in kidnappings is a mechanism of economic 
compensation due to the failing marginal income--a result of Colombia’s economic 
crisis.142 
 
B. COST OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY 
The cost of guerrilla activity can be measured as follow: 
(1) The increasing number of armed-fronts (close to 70 with almost 17,000 fighters) 
that spread all over the country has allowed its national-wide armed struggle 
against the state.  
(2) The intimiding political influence through violence is operating in almost 600 
municipalities over 1,085 Colombian municipalities.  
(3) The symbiotic relationship established inside the local, regional and national 
economy through figureheads, has reached  a very well-designed flow of cash.  
The established economic and intelligence net has allowed  maintaining  the 
guerrillas’ logistic lines of communication for drug exports and weapons imports.  
(4) The capability of causing inbalance in Colombia’s national economy through 
uncounted terrorists attacks onthe economic infrastructure, as well as through 
many sieges against small towns and villages causing internal migration, and 
fueling social tensions and instability in the big cities. Colombia has passed from 
being an exporter to an importer of six million tons of foodstuffs. Abandoning  
rural areas because of forced displacement has ruined one of the most prosperous 
sectors of the economy. Even the mining and hydrocarbon sector, which has 
enormous potential, has declined substantially. Projections indicate that in the 
next five years the nation will drop from exporting 500,000 barrels of oil a day; 
therefore, becoming a net importer of oil and gasoline.143 Without a doubt in the 
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last 16 years, the oil sector has suffered 5,343 terrorist attacks. Although, the 
worst history of attacks is registered in the last three years, in 1999 728 attacks 
occurred, and by October 2001, the total attacks were 1,587.  On the other hand, 
the theft of gasoline siphoned off from the pipelines registered a loss of 4,501 
barrels per day. Moreover, gasoline contraband from Venezuela, due to subsidize 
prices, is estimated in 9,800 barrels per day crossing the Venezuelan border in the 
direction of Colombia. Another seriously impacted sector is electrical power, 
where from 1999 until today, 916 towers of the interconnected electrical system 
by the terrorist attacks have been demolished. 144 
(5) The “brain-drain” of almost 1.1 million of well-educated Colombians, who left 
the country with their “know-how” and financial capitals to look for security and 
shelter. 
Briefly, the strategic goal of these Colombian terrorist organizations is condensed 
in Gaviria and Velez research, as follows:  
As long as rich and middle class Colombians continue feeling defenseless 
outside their homes and poor Colombians experience similar feelings 
inside theirs, the possibility of recovering economic prosperity in an 
atmosphere of peace is seriously compromised.... The concentration of 
violence [through terrorist tactics] beside its effects on the well being of 
the victims, deteriorates the quality of family life, increases the probability 
of behavioral problems among youths, and ultimately reduces socio-
economic mobility and contribute to perpetuate poverty.145  
 
In other words, perpetuating poverty is a very useful tool for small elites to get 
control and power over resources and population. Labor supply for the drug production 
and for the maintenance of military ranks inside the guerrillas and paramilitaries is a god 
example.  
The subversive and terrorist escalation also is measured in  military spending by 
the state to support its military forces through additional economic resources. For 
instance, between 1994 and 1998, Colombia’s military spending increased 44 percent in 
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real terms; that is 0.9 percent of the average GDP in relationship with military spending 
in Latin America for the same period. On the other hand, the terrorist’s capability to get 
enough profit through drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, war-tax, and theft easily 
overcomes the state budget’s capability to get revenues in a legal fashion.  
From this perspective, the question is who will be the first to achieve the limit of 
its economic possibilities for feeding its military apparatus? Or, in other words,  who will 
collapse first? Anyway, Colombians continue to assume the total cost of the conflict 
either through government taxes or through terrorist illegal taxation (ransom for 
kidnapping, war-tax, extortion, and so on). 
C. COST OF DRUG TRAFFICKING 
There is no doubt that the main fuel of the war in Colombia is the drug trade, 
since it is the primary source of financing for both the subversives and the paramilitary 
groups. The objective of narco-trafficking is obvious. Its illegal business will prosper to 
the extent that the state is incapable of suppressing the cultivation of coca and poppy and 
the establishment of laboratories to process cocaine and heroin. For this reason the 
geography of the drug trade coincides almost exactly with the geography of war because 
the drug trade flourishes in isolated and sometimes inaccessible jungle areas.  
Finally, after the September 11th attack on the U.S., 2001 differentiating between 
drug trafficking and subversion is not complicate since the first is feeding the terrorist 
actions of the second. The profit of drugs is spreading and fueling other terrorist 
movements through training, intelligence, weapons, and money-laundering. Today, any 
democratic government and even non-democratic government would find it difficult to 
give political status to Colombian terrorist organizations, as happened in the past.  
Briefly, the International Community has moved way from the perception that the 
domestic violent conflict is between the Colombian civil society and its armed forces 
against the narco-terrorist organizations (FARC, ELN and AUC) only. The International 
Community is aware that they have a responsibility (due to demand of drugs and money- 
laundering) to help construct Colombian peace. 
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Indeed, if 96 percent of the Colombian population, according to opinion polls, 146 
repudiates the actions of the terrorist groups due to the inability of building a stable 
political base, its time for the Colombian government and for the International 
Community to obligate the Colombian subversive organization (FARC, ELN, and AUC) 
and to negotiate a durable peace or to surrender via enough military force in a well- 
coordinated military campaign. If the only option is the second one, after exhausting the 
peace negotiation process, the support of the International Community must be focused 
on satellite surveillance and intelligence, support mobility, communications and logistic 
supply as well as political lobby in the international arena.  
Finally, the situation of thousands of peasants in these isolated regions needs to be 
addressed because the solidarity that exists among them with the subversive is the 
product of intimidation or passive acceptance. Moreover, most of these peasants join the 
guerrillas or paramilitaries to survive as fighters or as field hands picking the illicit crops. 
Thus, alternative economic programs for these peasants will be the best option to 
eradicate the cocaine industry and its corrupted impact on the economy. 
 
D. COST OF THE 1991 CONSTITUTION 
The cost of the 1991 Constitution can be measured as follow: 
(1) The judicial system continues to be weak showing high levels of impunity due to 
widespread intimidation and corruption. However, it is not possible to articulate 
the judicial system with its prison system yet.  
(2) There is not an effective oversight system over government institutions and its 
budgets, the audit system is functioning ex-post and sometimes after the state 
funds have been siphoned-off, and there are no real controls to impede it. 
(3) The 1991 Constitution is a rigid micro-management tool that hampers 
globalization and the flexibility that is needed for opening markets, labor supply, 
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and domestic and foreign investments. The 1991 Constitution criteria of pensions 
indexation, inflation goals, and the allocation of regional public expenditures (as 
a welfare state) complicate the flow of capital investments, services and goods in 
an open and competitive market. 
(4) As a result of few constitutional restrictions on the political parties, the 
atomization of parties is opening the door for individual dealings, secret pacts, 
and dark negotiations that block options for new political projects and ideas of 
national benefit. 
(5) Finally, the weak state institutions created with the 1991 Constitution 
demonstrated their incapacity to provide basic public goods: justice, security and 
defense. For this reason peace continues to be an elusive proposition, and the 
criminal actors who often violate the fundamental rights of citizens, especially the 
right of life, continue to exist. 
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The economic crisis of Colombia, that reached its peak in 1999, after Samper’s 
questionable administration, stems from the interaction and resulting synergies of an 
underground criminal drug economy and the growth of the FARC, ELN, and AUC 
challenge to the state’s authority. Notwithstanding, the downturn in the Colombian 
economy was a sharp reversal from the record of the previous half-century.  The 
economy began to unravel in the last half of the 1990s as a result of the complex blend of 
terrorism, political crisis, contraction in the construction sector (due to drug-cartels 
neutralization), decertification by the U.S. that reduced business confidence and 
contributed to the sharpening of the economic crisis. 
The confluence of the three interrelated variables subversion, drugs, and weak 
institutions has exacerbated even deeper problems in Colombian society, including the 
loss of central government authority, economic deterioration, and social disintegration. 
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The drug-trafficking and subversive problems continue intertwined and growing 
fast, so that effectively dealing with one will likely involve dealing with the other. 
Additionally, it is not easy after the lessons of September 11, 2001 to separate drugs from 
subversion, especially in the Colombian case. 
The ongoing violence and terrorism involved substantial economic cost. In a 
World Bank Research-2000 it has been estimated that between 4 and 9 percent of the 
Colombia’s GDP is lost each year as a result of criminal actions. 
Law enforcement and effective judicial institutions are the bottom line for dealing 
with the violence because violence has reduced  Colombia’s social capital by eroding the 
effectiveness of free press, businesses, and security institutions. The Colombian state 
needs to build confidence in its judicial and security institutions in order to minimize the 
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